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Chapter 1
Introduction
The introduction to this dissertation on natural resources and economic devel-
opment is structured in two parts. The first part motivates the general topic
whereas the second part declares my contributions to the individual chapters
and states their state of publishing.
1.1 Motivation
Poverty and environmental degradation are among the most pressing global
problems. The reduction of poverty and environmental sustainability are for-
mulated as Millennium Development Goals by the United Nations. Large achieve-
ments in the reduction of global poverty have been made since the formulation
of these goals but progress in environmental sustainability still lacks behind
(United Nations, 2012). In fact, environmental sustainability and economic de-
velopment may be conflicting goals. On the one hand, economic growth may
cause environmental degradation as it increases the demand for natural re-
sources (Arrow et al., 1995, 2004) and reduces the costs of resource usage (Tay-
lor, 2011; Squires and Vestergaard, 2013). On the other hand, abundant natural
resources may hinder economic development. Biodiversity hot spots and high
natural resource abundances are highly correlated with poverty (Barbier, 2010;
1
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Barrett et al., 2011) and a lack of economic growth (Sachs and Warner, 2001).
These relationships between natural resources and economic development are,
however, controversial (see e.g. Foster and Rosenzweig (2003) and Baland et al.
(2010) for opposite findings), may be nonlinear (Brock and Taylor, 2005, 2010)
and contingent on the distribution of the resources and the institutions that
govern resource use (Baland and Platteau, 1997; Galor, 2011b; van der Ploeg,
2011). The present dissertation addresses the question of how environmental
quality, wealth distribution and economic development are related. It focuses
on the impact of resource abundance and wealth distribution on the structural
transformation during the growth process, the effect of financial development
on resource use and how the lack of rules and regulations in developing coun-
tries affect environmental quality and production. It uses theoretical modeling,
model calibration and econometric techniques with data from field studies in
Azerbaijan, India and Iran to answer this question. The choice of the field sites
was mainly due to personal and scientific interest, local contacts and financ-
ing opportunities. The the exact questions that each chapter addresses evolved
from the local conditions of the field sites.
In Chapter 2 I use an overlapping generations model with a resource-dependent
and a resource-independent sector to show how the poor can be trapped in
the resource-dependent sector when fixed costs of investment exist and credit
markets are absent. This model confirms a positive but nonlinear relationship
between poverty and environmental degradation. Lump-sum wealth transfers
that increase inequality of wealth endowments can be intertemporally Pareto-
efficient and resolve the poverty trap if common pool externalities are present.
The introduction of tradable property rights has similar effects on development.
Chapter 3 uses data from a field survey in India to show that a positive resource
shock increases education levels. It shows further that educated individuals
are more likely to engage in resource-independent occupations such that the
resource shock induces a structural change that reduces resource dependency.
Chapter 4 deals with credit market distortions and labor allocation between
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skill-intensive intensive production and capital- and resource-intensive produc-
tion. It uses a two-sector two-period model with different interest rates for bor-
rowing secured by a collateral, for unsecured borrowing and for saving to show
that the impact of changes in interest rates on labor reallocation depends on the
initial wealth level of the household and the common pool externality. The last
chapter (Chapter 5) uses a dynamic forest model with livestock and timber pro-
duction to determine the socially optimal mix of forest usage. The calibrated
model shows that the current lack of use rights over forest resources in Azer-
baijan and Iran leads to low timber and livestock production. However, this
mixed production induces high levels of biodiversity that renders mixed pro-
duction optimal if biodiversity is highly valued.
1.2 Contributions
The dissertation consists of four chapters based on articles prepared for interna-
tional peer-reviewed journals. Most chapters use data from serval field surveys
in the Middle east and India. In the following I state my contributions to the
field studies and the resulting articles that constitute my dissertation.
The field survey in India was done in close collaboration with Marie-Catherine
Riekhof and supported by the World Bank, the Chilika Development Authority
and Palishree, a local NGO (Noack and Riekhof, 2011). The survey in Azer-
baijan was financially supported by the Michael Succow foundation and the
DAAD and was joint work with Michael Rietschel and Tobias Scharnweber.
The field study in Iran was supported by the University of Theran and was
undertaken by myself.
The article that underlays Chapter 2 is written together with Marie-Catherine
Riekhof and Martin Quaas. The original idea of this chapter evolved in dis-
cussions with Marie-Catherine Riekhof inspired by our observations in India.
The development of the modeling framework, the calculations and the writ-
ing was mainly done by myself but with inputs from Marie-Catherine Riekhof
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and Martin Quaas. Both contributed substantially to the section on property
rights. The article was presented in 2012 at the annual conference of the Eu-
ropean Association of Environmental and Resource Economists (EAERE), the
Monte Verita Conference on Sustainable Resource Use and Economic Dynam-
ics (SURED), the workshop of Research Committee for Environmental and Re-
source Economics (AURÖ) of the German Economic Association (Verein für
Socialpolitik), the annual conference of the International Institute of Fisheries
Economics and Trade (IIFET), the summer school ‘Equity and Efficiency in Fish-
eries’, on a meeting of the EIGEN project in Lüneburg and on seminars of the
Group of Environmental, Resource and Ecological Economics and the Institute
for Regional Research of the University of Kiel. It is not accepted for publication
by the time of writing.
Chapter 3 was prepared by myself and is part of a single authored article. It was
presented in 2012 at the summer school ‘Equity and Efficiency in Fisheries’ and
on seminars of the group of Environmental, Resource and Ecological Economics
and the Institute for Regional Research of the University of Kiel. It is accepted
for presentation on the conference of the Research Committee on Development
Economics (AEL) of the German Economic Association and the annual EAERE
conference in 2013. The paper is not accepted for publication by the time of
writing.
Chapter 4 evolved as an idea together with Marie-Catherine Riekhof based on
our field studies in India. The development of the modeling framework, the
calculations and the writing was mainly done by Marie-Catherine Riekhof with
inputs from Johannes Bröcker and myself. I contributed to the ideas and the
writing of the article. The article was presented at the IIFET conference in 2012,
the winter seminar of the German Section of the Regional Science Association in
2013 and on seminars of the Group of Environmental, Resource and Ecological
Economics and the Institute for Regional Research of the University of Kiel.
The last chapter, Chapter 5, is about forest degradation in the Middle East. This
article is based on my Diploma thesis which was substantially extended by a
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rigorous analytical treatment of the subject and the inclusion of biodiversity in
the analysis during my doctoral studies. The main calculations and the writing
of the article was done by myself with contributions of Martin Quaas, Michael
Manthey, Jack Ruitenbeek and Marvie Mohadjer. A later version of the chapter
was published in ‘Ecological Economics’ (Noack et al., 2010) and the article was
presented at the Brown Bag Seminar of the University of Kiel in 2010, the Ulvön
Conference on Environmental Economics and the AURÖ workshop in 2009.
Chapter 2
Redistribution and Development in
Resource Abundant Economies
with Marie-Catherine Riekhof and Martin Quaas
Abstract: This paper explores the effect of wealth redistribution and the in-
troduction of use rights on economic development. The development level of
an economy with a traditional sector that uses a renewable common pool re-
source for production and a modern resource independent sector depends on
the initial distribution of wealth. Redistributing wealth among the poor or in-
troducing use rights for the resource can improve the welfare of the poorest
and facilitate the transition from a resource based and poor economy to a mod-
ern developed economy. We apply our model to a large Indian inland fishery
to show that individuals in the traditional sector are trapped in poverty and
how redistribution of wealth or the introduction of use rights for the resource
increase the incomes of the worst-off and trigger a process of development.
6
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2.1 Introduction
The process of economic development is closely connected to a decline of the la-
bor share in the natural resource sector, for example in agriculture (Gollin, 2010)
or fisheries (Hannesson, 2007). Most theories of structural change explain the
shift of labor from the natural resource sector to the manufacturing sector as a
consequence of growth and assume that labor is allocated efficiently across both
sectors (Acemoglu and Guerrieri, 2008; Hansen and Prescott, 2002; Kongsamut
et al., 2001; Laitner, 2000). This assumption implies that the marginal produc-
tivity of labor is equal across both sectors which is, however, in sharp contrast to
empirical evidence. In fact, the returns to human capital are much higher in the
manufacturing sector than in agriculture and this income differential declines
with the per capita GDP of a country (Gollin, 2010; Vollrath, 2009). Further-
more, a large share of income differences between countries can be attributed
to this misallocation of labor (Duarte and Restuccia, 2010; Vollrath, 2009).
The underlying reasons for the inefficient allocation of labor and the low pro-
ductivity in some economies can be explained by credit market imperfections,
fixed costs of investment, and the unequal distribution of wealth (Galor and
Zeira, 1993; Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Aghion and Bolton, 1997; Matsuyama,
2006). However, these models assume that the poor are employed and earn
equal wages, and that production is resource independent. Most poor people
are, however, self employed (Banerjee and Duflo, 2007) and live in rural areas
where they rely on natural resources such as arable soil, pastures, fish stocks
or forests for their income (Dasgupta, 2010). Use rights over such resources are
often ill-defined or improperly enforced with resource degradation as a conse-
quence (Goldstein and Udry, 2008; Stavins, 2011). Typical results are declin-
ing incomes which perpetuate the poverty trap. Besley et al. (2012) show how
the introduction of property rights can improve the access to credit markets
and therefore foster development and Wang (2012) shows further that prop-
erty rights can also increases labor mobility. However, they neglect the positive
effect of property rights on natural resource conservation (Costello et al., 2010).
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In this paper we build a model to show how redistribution of wealth among
the poor in the traditional resource based sector or the introduction of resource
regulation can trigger a process of development. We apply our model to Chilika
Lagoon, a large Indian inland fishery which is a typical example of a poor rural
economy based on a common pool resource. At Chilika Lagoon incomes stag-
nated and fell behind the income of other occupational groups in the region dur-
ing the last fifty years whereas the number of fishermen increased fivefold (see
Section 2.5). In contrast to the case of Chilika Lagoon, Hannesson (2007) showed
that the average income of Norwegian fishermen remained on par with other
occupational groups in Norway during the last fifty years despite overfishing.
The strong decline of fishermen in Norway enabled the remaining fishermen to
expand their production and their incomes. In this paper we propose a theory
that explains the differences between the Norwegian and the Indian example.
We ask the question of how the wealth distribution of an economy is related to
its labor share in the natural resource sector and its development level and how
the introduction of resource regulation affects the country’s development level.
In the following section we introduce an overlapping generation’s model where
agents can work in a traditional sector and harvest a natural resource under
conditions of open access or work in a modern sector which is resource inde-
pendent. In Section 2.3, we show that different steady states evolve, depending
on the initial wealth distribution. The steady-state share of the workforce in
the traditional sector is negatively related to the development level of the econ-
omy. The income difference between the poorer individuals in the traditional
sector and the richer individuals in the modern sector declines with develop-
ment. Section 2.4 demonstrates that a redistribution from the rich to the poor
or a redistribution which initially increases wealth inequality among the poor
in the traditional sector can be Kaldor-Hicks efficient. Additionally, both redis-
tribution can also satisfy an intertemporal version of Rawl’s maximin criterion.
Section 2.4 also shows that a resource regulation which limits harvest has sim-
ilar effects. Further, tradability of the harvesting permits can trigger a process
of development that leads to a rich, developed economy with positive resource
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rents. In Section 2.5, we apply our model to the fishery of Chilika Lagoon and
explain the lack of response of the fishermen to their declining relative incomes
with their inability to invest in outside options. We show that some redistribu-
tions are both efficient and just, while others lead to a process of development
at the cost of the currently poor. The introduction of harvesting regulation is
efficient and just but only triggers a process of development when harvesting
permits are tradable. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The Model
Consider a small open economy with two sectors of production, the traditional,
‘resource’-based sector and the ‘modern’ sector, producing two goods that are
traded on world markets at given prices. There are four factors of production:
the resource stock, two types of sector-specific capital, and labor, which can be
used in both sectors. The economy is inhabited by a continuum of individuals
with a constant population size.
Each individual inelastically supplies one indivisible unit of labor. Individuals
are identical, except for their initial monetary endowments, bt, that their parents
bequeath to them. The distribution of bequests among the individuals who are
born in period t is described by the density function gt(b).
Each individual lives for two periods and has one child born in the second
period of her life. An individual who is born at time t inherits wealth bt and
makes her investment decision in the first period t of her life. By deciding on
whether to invest into capital specific to the traditional or the modern sector,
the individual also chooses the sector she will work in. Both types of capital
depreciate completely after one period of use. The individual works, uses the
capital, earns income yt+1, consumes a quantity ct+1 and bequeathes an amount
bt+1 in the second period of her life, t + 1. The individual values consumption,
ct+1, and the bequest to her offspring, bt+1, according to the utility function
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(Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Galor and Zeira, 1993):
ut+1 = (1− δ) log ct+1 + δ log bt+1. (2.1)
There are many different ways to introduce altruism. It could depend on the
consumption level of the child or on her utility. For a detailed discussion of
this utility function and its implication see Galor and Zeira (1993); Matsuyama
(2011). Observations show that individuals transfer much less to their children
than they consume (for example in the case of the Indian inland fishery con-
sidered in Section 2.5). We therefore assume that the amount parents bequeath
leaves their child capital constraint.1 This case prevails for
δ ∈ (0, 1/2). (2.2)
Utility maximization is subject to the budget constraint, yt+1 ≥ ct+1 + bt+1. The
first-order conditions from utility maximization yield ct+1 = (1− δ)yt+1 and
bt+1 = δyt+1.
Following Galor and Zeira (1993) and Banerjee and Newman (1993) individuals
working in the modern sector earn α > 0, provided they have invested a fixed
amount β > 0 (with β < α) into specific capital. This sector-specific investment
can be interpreted as a fixed capital cost of setting up a firm, of education or of
migration from rural to urban areas.
Only individuals with an initial wealth level bt ≥ β can afford the fixed in-
vestment required to work in the modern sector2, because of missing credit
1There are two steady state bequest levels for resource harvesters, depending on whether or
not resource harvesters are capital constraint. Whether or not this is the case depends on the
parameter δ. If the altruistic part in the utility function dominates, δ > 1/2, the non-binding
case prevails and if the egoistic part dominates, δ < 1/2, the constraint on investment in the
harvesting capital becomes binding.
2We refrain from introducing a low skilled resource independent sector, since it does not
change the main results.
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markets.3 In the following, we will refer to the individuals with initial wealth
bt < β as ‘poor’ and to the individuals with initial wealth bt > β as ‘rich’. The
income ymt+1 of an individual who is born in period t and works in the modern
sector is given by:
ymt+1 = α− β+ bt. (2.3)
The superscript m denotes the modern sector. Income α is independent of the
number of workers, because it is not bounded by the renewable resource. One
could interpret each individual in the modern sector as an entrepreneur that
produces a new good. Each brings capital (fixed investment) as well as labor
(see Matsuyama (2011)).
All individuals have open access to a renewable common pool resource, i.e.
individuals working in the traditional sector neglect the impact of their harvest
on the resource stock. Open access prevails for all agents in the economy, but
the number of agents is fixed. If an individual decides to work in the traditional
sector, she has to invest some amount kt > 0 into specific capital (for example,
boats and fishing gear).
The Schaefer harvesting function describes the harvest of an individual en-
gaged in the traditional sector. It has constant marginal productivity of effort,
et, and constant marginal productivity of the resource stock, Xt+1. Effort is
an intermediate input in harvesting produced by capital and labor (Hannes-
son, 1983). For mathematical convenience we assume that it is a Cobb-Douglas
composite with output elasticities of capital and labor each equal to 1/2. Using
that each individual supplies one indivisible unit of labor gives et =
√
kt. With
the factor productivity γ, the net income yrt+1 of an individual who is born in
period t and works in the traditional sector is given by
yrt+1 = γ
√
ktXt+1 − kt + bt. (2.4)
3The simplifying assumption of absent credit markets is stricter than in other studies (Galor
and Zeira, 1993; Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Aghion and Bolton, 1997; Matsuyama, 2006).
However, it does not change the qualitative results if credit markets are introduced as long as
they are imperfect.
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The superscript r denotes the resource sector. There is a direct feedback from
aggregate harvest, Ht+1, to the size of the resource stock. Aggregate harvest
Ht+1 is the integral over all individual harvests, where each individual may be
constrained in her harvesting decision by the distribution of inherited wealth,
gt(b). Using the logistic growth function to describe the continuous net growth
of the resource stock within a period, and assuming that for a given harvest
level the stock immediately reaches its equilibrium level, the resource stock
Xt+1 is implicitly given by
ρXt+1
(
1− Xt+1
κ
)
− H(Xt+1)t+1 = 0, (2.5)
where ρ is the intrinsic growth rate of the resource, and κ is the carrying capacity
of the ecosystem. The individual anticipates the resource stock as well as how
many individuals will be in the resource sector and how they will invest. Thus,
taking that into account she will decide on her own investment.
2.3 The Market Outcome
In this section we present the decentralized market solution with missing credit
markets and no access regulation to the resource. We derive the steady state as
well as the transitional dynamics. In the next section, we consider the efficient
allocation and how it can be reached.
Individuals working in the traditional sector decide on capital input. They
choose the investment level (γXt+1/2)2 that maximizes their income (2.4) for a
given Xt+1, provided this capital investment is lower than their initial wealth
bt. Thus, they choose
kt = k(bt, Xt+1) = min
{
bt, (γXt+1/2)2
}
. (2.6)
We take the variable symbol without time index to denote the variable as func-
tion of other variables.
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Individuals invest in harvesting capital up to the quantity where the marginal
return to capital in resource harvesting equals the marginal return of unproduc-
tive capital. The constraint on investment in harvesting capital is binding if the
marginal return to capital in resource harvesting exceeds the marginal return of
unproductive capital at the point bt. The individually optimal amount of capital
investment in resource harvesting is at its maximum when the resource stock is
at its carrying capacity. This situation yields the highest possible income in the
resource sector.
For a given environment which is described by (2.3), (2.4), (2.5) and the distri-
bution of wealth, the occupational choice of the individual follows from income
maximization as
yt+1 = y(bt, Xt+1)
= max{1β(bt)(α− β+ bt),γ
√
k(bt, Xt+1)Xt+1 − k(bt, Xt+1) + bt}. (2.7)
Each individual chooses the occupation that maximizes income subject to her
initial wealth and given the resource stock including the responses of the other
individuals. The indicator function 1β(bt) has the value one if bt ≥ β and zero
otherwise. It indicates whether an individual has the option to work in the
modern sector.
Individual wealth dynamics for the modern sector are given by
bmt+1 = δ(α− β+ bt), (2.8)
whereas individuals in the traditional sector bequeath
brt+1 = δ(γ
√
ktXt+1 − kt + bt) (2.9)
to their offsprings. Note that the resource stock Xt+1 is a function of the whole
wealth distribution gt(b) (cf. equations 2.6 and 2.5).
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The amount of wealth that is transferred from generation to generation may
decline or increase over time until a steady state is reached. In steady state,
bequests, incomes, and the size of the resource stock are constant over time.
The steady state bequest in the modern sector is given by
bm∗ =
δ
1− δ (α− β). (2.10)
To ensure that a modern sector can persist we assume that
δα > β, (2.11)
i.e. the bequest of an individual working in the modern sector is large enough
that her child can afford the fixed investment β.
The distribution of wealth degenerates in steady state, such that all individuals
engaged in the same (traditional or modern) sector bequeath the same amount
to their offspring. For the traditional sector we thus can solve (2.5) and (2.9)
for their steady states values. The steady state bequest is given by (see Ap-
pendix A.1)
br∗ =
(
δργκ
δn∗γ2κ + ρ
)2
, (2.12)
where n∗ ∈ [0, 1] is the mass of workers engaged in resource harvesting in
steady state, which depends on the initial wealth distribution and will be stud-
ied in the subsequent analysis. The steady state bequest in the traditional sector
increases in γ only if γ <
√
ρ/(n∗δκ) and decreases in γ for larger values of γ
(see Lemma A.1 in Appendix A.2). This is because the harvesting efficiency
parameter has two opposing effects on steady state bequest. It increases the
efficiency of harvesting capital and labor and thus increases revenues, but the
increase in aggregate harvesting efficiency reduces the stock size and thus im-
pacts harvest negatively. The two opposing effects illustrate that a more effi-
cient harvesting technology may be detrimental to incomes in the traditional
sector when there is a common pool externality.
Chapter 2. Redistribution and Development in Resource Abundant Economies 15
The steady state resource stock is given by (see Appendix A.1)
X∗ =
ρκ
ρ+ δn∗γ2κ
. (2.13)
While the steady state bequest increases with δ, steady state income, which is
given by br∗/δ, increases in δ only for δ < ρ/(n∗γ2κ), but decreases with δ for
δ > ρ/(n∗γ2κ). The reason is that the increase of bequest with δ increases har-
vesting capital, thus aggravating resource overuse, which reduces income in the
traditional sector. Higher altruism may therefore affect the economy adversely
for a similar reason as technological efficiency. Income increases in the resource
productivity, i.e. in κ and ρ. One could expect that a more productive resource
attracts more harvesters, who then deplete the resource. This is not the case,
because individuals working in the modern sector would anticipate depletion
and would not enter.
To determine the mass of individuals who engage in resource harvesting in
steady state (n∗) we look at occupational choice next. The poor have no choice
but to work in the traditional sector. A rich individual chooses to work in the
modern (traditional) sector over working in the traditional (modern) sector in
steady state if br∗ < bm∗ (br∗ > bm∗ ) and is indifferent between working in the
traditional and the modern sector if br∗ = bm∗ , which implies that the mass of
individuals engaged in the traditional sector is
n =
ρ
γ
(
1√
bm∗
− 1
δγκ
)
. (2.14)
This mass of individuals in the resource sector decreases in the incomes of the
industrial sector. This relation implies that when incomes rise in the modern
sector, individuals leave the traditional sector and the income in the resource
sector rises as a response, as it is the case in the Norwegian fishery (Hannesson,
2007).
Following Galor and Zeira (1993) we call an economy developed if the lowest
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bequest steady state is larger than β, i.e. if all individuals can afford the invest-
ment which is necessary to work in the modern sector. We call an economy
underdeveloped if the lowest bequest steady state is lower than β. This classifica-
tion of ‘development’ differs from the common definition which refers to mean
income. Our measure is relative and is therefore more related to the maximin
criterion of Rawls.
Given bm∗ > β from assumption (2.11) the economy is developed in steady state
if br∗ ≥ β, i.e. if n∗ ≤ n with
n ≡ ρ
γ
(
1√
β
− 1
δ γ κ
)
. (2.15)
Assumption (2.11) also implies n > n, which reflects that steady-state incomes
in both sectors can only be equal in a developed economy. The mass n defines
the maximum number of individuals that can escape poverty through resource
harvesting. It increases in ρ, κ and δ and decreases in β. A more productive
resource can lift a larger share of the population out of poverty. The influence
of altruism, δ, on development is also positive. However, higher technological
efficiency has an ambiguous impact on development, as n increases in γ only if√
β > ρδγκ.
We further speak of a modern economy if there is no resource harvesting activity.
A traditional economy in contrast is an economy where only resource harvest-
ing takes place, and a mixed economy is an economy where both activities are
undertaken.
As all individuals are rich in a developed economy, all can freely choose oc-
cupations. Thus, all three cases are possible. The following proposition gives
conditions for a developed economy to be either modern, traditional or mixed:
Proposition 2.1. A developed economy in steady state is modern if n < 0, traditional
if n > 1, and mixed if 0 ≤ n ≤ 1.
The proof is given in Appendix A.2.
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The poor in an undeveloped economy have no choice but to work in the tradi-
tional sector. Hence, an undeveloped economy cannot be modern.
Proposition 2.2. An undeveloped economy in steady state is traditional if n∗ = 1,
and mixed if n ≤ n∗ < 1.
In an undeveloped and mixed economy, the income levels in both sectors differ.
If n < 1, there are multiple steady states, and the economy can either be devel-
oped or undeveloped in steady state, depending on the initial number of poor.
The main difference between an undeveloped and mixed and a developed and
mixed economy is that in the former more individuals work in the traditional
sector, driving the resource down which impoverishes the resource harvesters.
This relation is in line with the empirical findings that less developed economies
have a larger share of their workforce in the resource sector.
Next we want to analyze transitional dynamics to show how the different steady
states evolve. Following Galor and Moav (2004) the economy contains two
groups of individuals, the poor and the rich. The focus on only two groups
is to clarify the argument on the circumstances in which a bigger share of the
initially poor becomes rich. The fraction np ∈ [0, 1] of the individuals are poor
and possess b0 = bp < β and the remaining fraction nw = 1− np are rich with
b0 = bw ≥ β. Further, we assume that the wealth motions are monotone (see
Appendix A.3). All descendants of the rich stay rich because of (2.11). The
descendants of the poor may accumulate wealth over time but they can only
become rich if the bequest of one generation equals or surpasses β at one point
in time. The poor can therefore only become rich if br∗ ≥ β for n = np, i.e. if
nP < n.
Thus, an economy that starts with a large share of its population in poverty
retains a large share of its population in poverty. This is stated formally in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2.3. A developed economy (an underdeveloped economy) evolves from an
initial distribution of capital if np ≤ n ( np > n).
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FIGURE 2.1: Phase Diagram.
The proof is given in Appendix A.4.
The steady states, the dynamics of bequest, and the share of individuals in the
resource sector are depicted in Figure 2.1 for an intermediate productive re-
source where 0 < n < n < 1. An economy that starts with a low share of poor
individuals in the traditional sector (n < n) becomes a developed and mixed
economy. The wealth of all individuals approaches bm∗ = br∗ and the share of the
individuals in the traditional sector approaches n. An economy that starts with
many poor individuals harvesting the resource (n > n) becomes a undeveloped
and mixed economy. The wealth of the poor approaches br∗ < β and the wealth
of the rich approaches bm∗ > β. The share of individuals in the resource sector
remains constant over time. The income of the poor in an undeveloped and
mixed economy declines in the number of initially poor individuals, np = n.
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2.4 Efficiency, Equity, and Resource Regulation
We now turn to the analysis of how inequality and economic development are
interrelated by studying, first, the benchmark of the first best outcome, second,
how redistributions of wealth may affect the development level of the economy,
and, third, how regulation of access to the resource may affect the development
of the economy. Throughout this section, we assume that the economy is in
a steady state initially, such that the distribution of wealth is degenerated: all
individuals in either sector have the same level of wealth. Additionally, we
assume that the wealth dynamics are monotone (see Appendix A.3) such that
no overshooting occurs.
2.4.1 First Best
We first consider the benchmark case of the long-term Kaldor-Hicks efficient al-
location of capital and labor. Obviously, the economy considered here will fail
to reach the first-best allocation because of missing credit markets and unreg-
ulated access to the resource. The steady-state allocation that is Kaldor-Hicks
efficient is the one that maximizes aggregate income of all individuals in the
second period of their life. It is characterized by the following conditions (see
Appendix A.7):
k = α− β (2.16)
n =
ρ
γ
(
1
2
√
α− β −
1
γ κ
)
(2.17)
yr =
γ κ
2
√
α− β. (2.18)
Resource harvesting takes place in the first-best alloctaion, i.e. n > 0, if
√
α− β <
γ κ/2 (cf. 2.17). If this condition is fulfilled, the resource is harvested at the
maximum sustainable yield stock level X = κ/2 and incomes are higher in the
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traditional than in the modern sector, i.e.
yr =
γ κ
2
√
α− β > α− β = ym. (2.19)
The reason for this is that resource rents are generated in the traditional sector.
The first-best allocation could be implemented if there was a well-functioning
credit market and if individuals in the traditional sector would hold individual
harvesting rights with an appropriate restriction of the aggregate harvesting
quantity. In the following we analyze how two types of second-best policies
may foster development if such a first-best policy is not feasible.
2.4.2 Redistribution
We consider redistributions among individuals in the first period of their life,
after they received their respective bequests, but before they decide on their
investment. A redistribution decreases the wealth of ν > 0 individuals (the
‘disadvantaged’) by an amount τ > 0 and increases the wealth of µ individ-
uals (the ‘advantaged’) by an amount (ν τ)/µ. A redistribution is feasible as
long as bt − τ ≥ 0 for the wealth level bt of the disadvantaged. A redistri-
bution increases long-term Kaldor-Hicks efficiency if the aggregate income of
the steady state that will be reached after the redistribution exceeds the aggre-
gate income of the steady state that prevails without the redistribution. Taking
wealth from some individuals and giving it to others is an issue of distribu-
tive justice. The application of an inter-generational version of the maximin
criterion incorporates these concerns in our analysis. It asks if a redistribution
benefits the worst-off individuals. A redistribution can further shift the econ-
omy from an underdeveloped state to a developed state if only n¯ individuals
remain after the redistribution in the resource sector (see condition (2.15)).
When the redistribution is among the poor, the disadvantaged are the worst-off
individuals in society. However, even they may benefit from a redistribution.
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To show this, we consider redistributions where all poor individuals are af-
fected by the redistribution, i.e. µ = n∗ − ν, as then the amount taken from the
disadvantaged is minimized for given values of µ and τ.
Proposition 2.4. A one shot redistribution among the poor increases long-term Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency if
br∗ +
ν
n∗ − ντ ≥ β, (2.20)
and it benefits the worst-off individuals if additionally
√
br∗
(
1− n∗ γ
ρ
√
br∗
)
≤ √br∗ − τ (1− ν γρ√br∗ − τ
)
. (2.21)
The economy becomes developed if (2.20) holds and ν ≤ n.
The proof is given in Appendix A.5.
Under condition (2.20), the advantaged of the redistribution leave the tradi-
tional sector, thus alleviating the problem of resource-overuse. If condition (2.21)
holds, the resulting increase in the incomes of the remaining resource harvesters
due to the increasing resource stock is larger than the disadvantage from the re-
distribution. The result is in line with Baland and Platteau (1997) who show that
more inequality can be an Pareto improvement in the management of the com-
mons. Note also that the one shot redistribution defined by condition (2.21) is
intertemporally Pareto efficient. Not only the disadvantaged individuals them-
selves, but also their descendants are better off after redistribution.4
Redistributions among the rich cannot increase long-term efficiency. It may
even decrease long-term efficiency if ν > n and max{br∗, bm∗ } − τ < β such
that the disadvantaged fall into poverty. In the same line, a redistribution from
the poor to the rich cannot increase long-term efficiency either. By contrast, a
redistribution from the rich to the poor may increase long-term efficiency. It
4Condition (2.20) is sufficient, but not necessary for a one-shot redistribution to increase
long-term efficiency. A redistribution that increases inequality among the poor can increase
long-term efficiency even if it does not satisfy (2.20) when the assumption of monotone bequest
dynamics in the resource sector is relaxed.
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may come in the form of a progressive income tax, if µ = n∗, or as some more
unequal form of redistribution if µ < n∗.
Proposition 2.5. A one shot redistribution from the rich to the poor increases long-
term Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and benefits the worst-off if
br∗ +
ν
µ
τ ≥ β and bm∗ − τ ≥ β. (2.22)
The economy becomes developed if additionally ν ≤ n.
The proof is given in Appendix A.6.
Redistributions will be difficult to implement even if they are Pareto efficient
unless they are voluntary. In the following section we propose use rights as a
market based redistributive policy.
2.4.3 Resource Regulation
While the focus in the previous section on redistribution was solely on increas-
ing aggregate income through enabling some individuals to leave the resource
sector, this section on resource regulation considers an additional channel to in-
crease aggregate income, namely the reduction of resource overuse. We start
with considering the pure effect of resource regulation. The regulation limits
aggregate harvest to the level that maximizes the aggregate steady state income
of resource users, given the number n∗ of individuals in the traditional sector.
Under the assumptions made here, this is equivalent to limiting individual har-
vesting capital to the level (see Appendix A.8)
k¯ =
(
γ ρ κ
2 (n∗ γ2 κ + ρ)
)2
. (2.23)
This way of regulation improves efficiency of resource use only if it is binding.
This might not be the case if the resource harvesters are to poor to buy more
than k¯ harvesting capital.
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Proposition 2.6. Regulating access to the renewable resource in the traditional sector
increases long-run efficiency if
δ >
ρ
n∗ γ2 κ + 2 ρ
(2.24)
and benefits the worst-off individuals if additionally br∗ < bm∗ . Regulation suffices to
develop the economy if
δ
1− δ
γ2 ρ κ2
4 (n∗ γ2 κ + ρ)
≥ β. (2.25)
The proof is given in Appendix A.9.
If the altruistic part of utility is small enough (i.e. if (2.24) does not hold), indi-
viduals are so wealth-constrained that limiting individual resource use would
not improve efficiency. This is the case if parents working in the traditional sec-
tor have a very low income or if the altruistic part of their utility function is low,
as they then endow their children only with a very small amount of capital.
Condition (2.24) states that the poor are already wealthy enough to overuse the
resource. Under this condition, limiting individual harvesting capital increases
efficiency. Note that this increase in efficiency comes about without movement
of labor from the traditional to the modern sector. The regulation benefits the
worst-off individuals if condition (2.24) holds and the resource users are poorer
than the individuals working in the modern sector. We show in Appendix A.9
that for a underdeveloped economy (2.25) implies (2.24), but not vice versa.
Thus, being able to improve efficiency by regulating access to the resource does
not always foster development.
Implementing the harvesting limit by means of individual tradable use rights
broadens the scope for development, however, as some individuals may be able
to afford the fixed investment required to work in the modern sector through
selling their rights. As they leave the traditional sector, the problem of resource
overuse further alleviates and aggregate income increases. This process may
finally render the economy in a developed state. We explore this possibility in
the following.
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A binding regulation implies that individuals do not fully use their bequest
for investment in harvesting capital. This means that some individuals have
scope for increasing their harvest (and income) by using more harvesting cap-
ital, which may be allowed provided some others reduce harvesting effort. A
market for use rights may evolve where some individuals sell their use right,
and others use it. We introduce the use rights in forms of harvesting capital
allowances.5 The initial harvesting capital allowances are grandfathered. The
quantity of capital for each of the n∗ fishermen is set to k¯, as given by (2.23).
The children of the resource harvesters then inherit the use rights from their
parents.6 For the next generation, the total harvesting capital allowance can ei-
ther stay on the initial level or can be adapted to again maximize income of the
current resource harvesters. The general results do not depend on either of the
specifications.
In an underdeveloped economy, a use right market only improves efficiency
further as compared to pure regulation if the individuals who sell use rights
become sufficiently wealthy to enter the modern sector. Otherwise, no market
transactions will occur, as no individual can improve over the initial situation
by selling use rights. We only consider the situation where regulating alone
is not sufficient to make everybody rich and additional income from selling the
use right is needed to afford β. Individuals who are willing to buy an additional
marginal harvesting capital allowance would bid up to the marginal productiv-
ity of harvesting capital. Thus, the market price p of the allowance would be
equal to (see Appendix A.8)
p =
n∗ γ2 κ + 2 ρ
2 ρ
. (2.26)
Note that the market price for the use rights increases in the number of resource
harvesters. Still, since credit markets are absent, the bequest limits the amount
5Under the given assumptions this approach is equivalent to other forms of transferable use
rights, in particular transferable harvesting rights, but the mathematics are more transparent.
6Since the parents only care for the bequest to their children but not for their utility, they
do not take into account that resource incomes may eventually exceed incomes in the modern
sector due to the resource rent.
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of fishery capital and additional use rights an individual can finance. This im-
poses a limit to the overall demand for use rights, and thus to the number of
individuals that can leave the traditional sector each generation. However, as
the following proposition states, once trade in use rights started, it is only a
matter of time until the economy develops.
Proposition 2.7. Assume (2.24). Resource regulation by means of transferable use
rights moves the economy from undeveloped to developed if
n∗ γ2 κ + 2 ρ
2 ρ
(
γ ρ κ
2 (n∗ γ2 κ + ρ)
)2
+ br∗ ≥ β. (2.27)
The proof is given in Appendix A.10.
Under condition (2.27) some individuals will be able to leave the traditional
sector. The remaining individuals will be better off, because first, reduced over-
all effort due to less labor increases the resource stock, and second, harvesting
capital per individual increases. They thus bequeath a larger amount. Also,
the market value of the resource use rights per individual increases over time.
Thus, condition (2.27) will always be fulfilled for the next generation of resource
users as well, and further individuals will leave the traditional sector. This pro-
cess of development will end only if the economy is developed, i.e. when re-
source harvesters have no incentive to leave the traditional sector. This is the
case for
yr∗ = ym∗ + p∗k¯∗ (2.28)
with the steady state use right price p∗ and the steady state capital allowance
per capita k¯∗. The duration until the economy reaches the steady stats depends
on the initial share of resource harvesters and their wealth, since credit markets
are absent.
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2.5 Case Study of an Indian Inland Fishery
The purpose of this section is twofold. First, we apply the model to the large
inland fishery of Chilika Lagoon in Orissa, India, to demonstrate that it can
explain why individuals stay in the traditional sector even though their incomes
are low and declining relative to the average income in Orissa. Second, we
show how the model can be used to evaluate redistributional policies and the
introduction of use rights. All data stem from a field survey of 500 households
that was carried out by the authors in 2011 (Noack and Riekhof, 2011).
The fishery at Chilika Lagoon comprised 32,500 active fishermen who harvested
an annual amount of 19,200 metric tons (MT) of fish and shellfish in 2010/11.
Per capita catches and real fishery incomes at Chilika Lagoon have fluctuated
largely in the last 60 years without a clear trend (Figure 2.2).7 Despite a declin-
ing relative income in the fishery, the number of fishermen has risen continu-
ously during this period (Figure 2.3). The share of Orissa’s workforce in the
fishery also increased since 1950: the number of fishermen at Chilika Lagoon
increased fivefold whereas the total population of Orissa increased only three-
fold. This increase of fishermen may have reduced the fish stock and caused the
fishermen’s incomes to stagnate. At present an average fisherman earns about
70 Rs per operation day.8 In comparison, a teacher in a governmental school in
rural areas of Orissa earns ten times more per day (World Bank, 2009).
Before applying the model to the case Chilika Lagoon fishery in Orissa we dis-
cuss the assumption of missing credit markets and the income alternatives in
the modern sector that require some fixed investment.
At Chilika Lagoon, credit markets exist to some degree, and 86 % of the fisher-
men are actually indebted. However, average loan sizes are small (about 30,000
7The increase of catches in 2000 is due to a hydrological manipulation of the lagoon (Moha-
patra et al., 2007).
8The exchange rate in 2011 was 1 USD ≈ 45 Rs.
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FIGURE 2.2: Fish and Shellfish Landings.
FIGURE 2.3: Number of Fishermen.
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Rs) and average interest rates are high (56 % per year). Most importantly for our
question, loan purposes are restricted. Most credit arrangements rely on fish-
ing devices as collateral and are therefore only available for fishing purposes.
Credit possibilities for education or other income alternatives are virtually ab-
sent. Only 0.5 % of the loans are used for education, and only 0.1 % are used for
other income generating purposes. Even improving existing credit market con-
ditions does not necessarily increase investment in income alternatives outside
the resource sector (Chpater 4). Thus, it seems reasonable to assume missing
credit markets for education or other forms of investment into income alterna-
tives.
A second major assumption concerns the income alternative of fishermen in the
modern sector. Very few individuals left the fishery to work for higher wages
although such cases exist (e.g. five individuals out of the 500 surveyed fishing
households work as teachers).9 For our application of the model, we assume
that the income alternative of fishermen is to work as teacher and that the fixed
investment takes the form of education. We use teaching as income alternative
since fishermen belong to the scheduled casts for which the government sets a
proportion of all possible government positions aside. Finding a job as teacher
may therefore be relatively easy for fishermen, while other jobs in the modern
sector may be difficult to attain for fishermen because of the cast system. Fur-
ther, the salaries for teachers are low compared to salaries for equally qualified
workers in the governmental and non governmental sector (World Bank, 2009),
and investment requirements to enter the education sector are relatively low as
well. Using a job as a teacher to parameterize income in the modern sector and
fixed investment requirements to enter the modern sector is thus a conservative
assumption.
9Some fishermen work as unskilled construction workers in nearby cities. Although daily
wages for unskilled workers are higher than average daily fishing incomes, irregular employ-
ment and higher living costs may render construction work less attractive, and only the poorest
fishermen work on construction sites. As mentioned in Section 2.2 an income alternative in
the unskilled sector does not change the model results qualitatively. We neglect this alternative
occupation in the following.
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FIGURE 2.4: Main Activity.
2.5.1 Model Calibration
As the period (generation) length we use 40 years, which reflects the average
number of years a fisherman spends harvesting in Chilika Lagoon i.e. from his
early twenties until his early sixties. Figure 2.4 displays the share of the male
population with either fishing or education as their main activity (n= 3,492).
Fish from the Chilika Lagoon is sold on national and global markets at a given
price of 47.8 Rs per kg. In what follows, we express the units of fish directly in
units of monetary value. Table 2.1 gives an overview over all calibrated param-
eters and initial variable values.
There is no information of resource productivity in Chilika Lagoon readily avail-
able. We therefore estimate the carrying capacity of the fish stock and its repro-
duction rate using the method developed by Martell and Froese (2012) with
data on aggregate harvest from 2001 to 2010. Data on official landings is pro-
vided by the Chilika Development Authority. According to our survey, actual
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harvest exceeds official landings by a factor of 1.6 due to landings at unofficial
landing centers and fish for home consumption. We adjusted the official figures
accordingly.
The obtained estimates are ρ = 1.8 (sd = 0.9) and κˆ = 57, 000 MT (sd = 23, 000),
corresponding to κ = 2724.6 million Rs. The current (in 2010) fish stock can be
calculated from these parameters and the current harvest H2010 = 19, 200 MT
per year converted into monetary units as X2010 = κ2 −
√(
κ
2
)2 − κH2010ρ = 679.2
Mio Rs. This reflects that most commercially important fish stocks at Chilika
Lagoon are currently slightly overfished (Bhatta et al., 2009), i.e. X2010 is smaller
than the maximum sustainable yield stock κ/2.
Next we look at incomes and capital input in the fishery. An average fishing
unit comprises a crew of 3.5 fishermen (sd = 2.5), and operates on 225 days per
year (sd = 65). As capital inputs, all fishing units use nets, 95 % use boats, and
53 % use an engine. The value of average fishing capital is 88,480 Rs per fishing
unit equaling 25,280 Rs per fisherman (see Appendix A.11). Total capital costs
are 207 Rs per fishing unit and operation day (see Appendix A.11), about half
of the revenues. With this capital input an average fishing unit catches 9.2 kg
(sd = 8.7) of fish per operation day, yielding a revenue of 440 Rs (sd = 430) per
operation day.
The fishermen in one fishing unit share the revenues such that the nets, the
boat, the engine, and each fishermen receive an equal share. Each fisherman
thus gets 440/(3+ 3.5) ≈ 70 Rs per day, or 40× 225× 70 = 630,000 Rs over the
whole working life as a fisherman. The three shares of the revenues that pay
for the capital equal 203 Rs/day, roughly equal to the daily operation costs of
capital and also roughly equal to half the overall cost.10 With these estimates,
we obtain γ = 630/(
√
25.28× 680.29) = 0.184.
As discussed above, we assume that the income alternative of fishermen is
to work as teacher. The salaries of teachers in 2011 were between 11,000 and
10Thus, our above assumption of an output elasticity equal to 1/2 is reasonable for the Chilika
Lagoon fishery.
Chapter 2. Redistribution and Development in Resource Abundant Economies 31
18,000 Rs per month in Orissa. We use the average of 14,500 Rs per month for
calibration, which is also in line with the independent data for governmental
secondary school teachers in rural areas of Orissa in 2005 (World Bank, 2009).
Summing this over a period of 40 years gives α = 6, 960, 000 Rs.
Becoming a secondary teacher in India requires senior secondary education
(two years), a bachelor’s degree (tree years) and a teachers training course (one
year) (UNESCO, 2006). The first ten years of primary education are obligatory
and free in Orissa, but higher secondary and higher education is facultative
and costly. In our survey the annual household spending per person attend-
ing senior secondary school or high school was 7,400 Rs (sd = 9,140), which is
somewhat below average expenditures on senior secondary education in rural
Orissa (World Bank, 2009). Households with children attending college spend
annually on average 13,100 Rs (sd = 12,500) per student for education. Ad-
ditionally, education has the opportunity costs of not working as a fishermen.
Adding the opportunity costs to the education expenditure and summing over
six years yields 2× 7, 400 + 3× 13, 100 + 6× 225× 70 = 161, 700 Rs. This is a
conservative estimation, as additional costs of living apart from the parents or
alternatively the transportation costs are neglected. Agarwal (2006) for example
reports 300, 000 Rs as the size of an average student loan.
To calibrate the utility parameter δ, we use two independent approaches. Since
the steady state bequest in the fishery sector equals the amount of capital the
child has available to set up a fishing unit, we may use the per capita setup costs
of a fishing unit to estimate δ, which is 4 % of the period income of a fisherman.
As a second approach to estimate δ we take the household expenditure on edu-
cation, which may be taken as a proxy for the intergenerational wealth transfer.
The average household expenditure share on education in our survey is 6.9 %
(sd = 8.7) which is in line with the findings of Pattnaik and Kobayashi (2009)
and Samal and Meher (2003). In what follows we assume that δ is in between
both estimates and use the figure δ = 0.06.
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TABLE 2.1: Parameter Values and Initial Values.
symbol ρ κ α β γ δ X2010 n∗
value 1.8 2, 725 6.960 0.1617 0.184 0.06 680.3 32, 500
The values for κ, α, β, X2010 are given in 106 Rs, n∗ is the number of active
fishermen and ρ, γ and δ are unitless.
2.5.2 Results and Robustness
With the values for the parameters and variables summarized in Table 2.1 the
steady state bequest is br∗ = 76, 600 Rs for fishermen and bm∗ = 434, 000 Rs for
teachers.
As br∗ < β, fishermen cannot affort the investment to become teachers, which
explains why the fishermen stayed in the fishery at Chilika Lagoon even though
the incomes are low and declining. The subjective perception of the fishermen
in Chilika is in line with this result: 65 % of the surveyed households stated that
the reason for not attaining higher education was that they could not afford it.
We also found that the chance of children going to school or college increased
significantly with the income of the household head.
As a robustness check of this explanation, we consider which changes in pa-
rameter values would be necessary to change the result br∗ < β. Keeping all
other parameters as calibrated, educational costs, β, would need to decrease by
53 % or the intrinsic growth rate, ρ, would need to increase by 81 % to change
this result. The fishermen remain trapped, i.e. br∗ < β, for all possible values of
the carrying capacity, κ, and for all δ ∈ (0, 1/2). These results indicate that the
general conclusion that the fishermen in Chilika are trapped in poverty under
current conditions is fairly robust.
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2.5.3 Policies for Development
We will now apply the model to find and evaluate redistribution and regula-
tion schemes that improve the situation of the fishermen. In Proposition 2.4
we showed that a redistribution among the fishermen may increase long-term
efficiency. A redistribution that makes some individuals worse off may be po-
litically infeasible. We therefore consider a one shot redistribution among the
poor as defined in Proposition 2.4, which makes the worst-off individuals bet-
ter off and leads to a Pareto improvement. An advantaged fisherman needs
at least β − br∗ Rs as a transfer payment to invest in education and leave the
fishery. The most effective redistribution would give the advantaged the exact
amount that is required to invest in education, and would include all fishermen
in the redistribution scheme such that the costs of education for the advantaged
is shared among the largest possible number of individuals. The amount taken
from the disadvantaged is a function of their number, τ = (β−b
r∗)(n∗−ν)
ν . The
only remaining questions is now to choose the number of disadvantaged, ν.
Figure 2.5 summarizes the results of redistribution depending on the number
of disadvantaged. The horizontal lines depict the steady state bequest of fish-
ermen and teachers before the redistribution as well as the cost of education.
The figure further shows the average steady state bequest after redistribution
and the amount that the first generation which is affected by redistribution be-
queaths to their children. If the number of disadvantaged is too low, even tak-
ing away all their wealth will not be enough to lift the rest of the fishermen
out of poverty. At least 17,113 disadvantaged fishermen are needed to pay the
educational costs of the advantaged. If the number of disadvantaged increases,
two interesting results arise. The lightly shaded area shows the redistributions
for which also the worst-off individuals – the disadvantaged – benefit from the
redistribution. Comparing the bequests of the disadvantaged before and after
redistribution one sees that it increased after redistribution. This is due to the
increased resource stock as a result of reduced aggregate and per capita fish-
ing capital and reduced fishery labor. Second, there are redistributions marked
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FIGURE 2.5: Redistributions.
by the darkly shaded area in Figure 2.5 which do not improve the well-being
of the worst-off, but for which the descendants of the disadvantaged become
eventually rich and the economy develops. This may be considered a tradeoff
between inter-generational justice and long-run efficiency.
In Section 2.4.3 we showed how the introduction of use rights may foster de-
velopment. Such individual use rights might come in the form of individual
transferable quotas (ITQs) or territorial use rights, which existed at Chilika La-
goon, but are no longer in place.11 In the following we apply our results on
resource regulation from Section 2.4.3 to the fishery at Chilika Lagoon. The op-
timal capital constraint for the initial number of fishermen is k¯ = 37, 444 Rs
which results in steady state bequest of br∗ = 93, 920 Rs (see Table 2.2). The
regulation would increase incomes of the fishermen but not to a sufficient ex-
tent that the economy would become developed. However, when use rights
are tradable, their market value enables some individuals immediately to leave
11The fact that 75 % of the species are migratory (Mohapatra et al., 2007) may reduce the
effectiveness of territorial use rights.
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FIGURE 2.6: Introduction of Use Rights.
the fishery which triggers the development process (Proposition 2.7). The limit
to fishery capital, k¯, can be either set only once such that the individual capital
allowance in the next generation is k¯t+1 = k¯t
(
nt
nt−et+1
)
with the number of fish-
ermen nt at time t and the number et+1 of fishermen who leave the fishery at
t + 1, or the capital allowance can be adjusted in each generation. Adjustment
occurs to again maximize the average income in the resource sector. We report
both results in Table 2.2.
Figure 2.6 summarizes the transitional dynamics that follow the introduction
of individually transferable use rights where the allowed capital is set in the
beginning and held constant henceforward (the dynamics are similar for a pe-
riodically adapted capital allowance). The number of individuals that leave the
fishery each period is determined by the budget constraints of the remaining
fishermen k¯t(1+
et+1
nt+1
(1+ pt+1)) ≤ brt .
In Figure 2.6, the regulation is introduced between the first and second gen-
eration such that the first generation depict the steady state that evolves from
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TABLE 2.2: Performance of Policy Measures.
bequest income # of fishermen
first best 1,597,464 55,468 1,626
status quo (ss) 76,561 2,658 32,500
maximin red. (1) 118,363 4,110 23,173
maximin red. (ss) 119,615 4,153 23,173
development red. (1) 69,735 2,421 17,952
development red. (ss) 433,934 15,067 5,448
regulation (1) 92,878 3,225 32,500
regulation (ss) 93,920 3,261 32,500
tradable use rights 1 & 2 (1) 94,846 3,293 30,968
tradable use rights 1 (ss) 885,176 30,735 1,037
tradable use rights 2 (ss) 1,120,337 38,901 1,947
Bequests (in Rs), incomes (in Rs/month), and the number of fishermen under different pol-
icy scenarios. The calculations take the steady state that evolves without any policy as ref-
erence point (status quo). (1) denotes the first generation which is affected by the respective
policy and (ss) denotes the steady state which is reached after the policy is carried out. The
‘maximin redistribution’ is the redistribution that maximizes the income of the disadvan-
taged. The ‘development redistribution’ is the redistribution such that ν = n. ‘Regulation’
stands for the policy that permits only k¯ capital per individual but does not allow the trad-
ing of use rights. Tradable use rights 1 are use rights with a constant constraint on capital, k¯,
which is set for n∗ = 32, 500. Tradable use rights 2 are use rights with a variable constraint
on capital, k¯, which is set according to the remaining fishermen i.e. n∗ = 1, 947 in steady
state.
the status quo. The first panel shows the bequest of the fishermen. It increases
through the introduction of use rights and keeps on increasing while the econ-
omy develops. When bequests rise above the educational costs the dynamics
change and the economy becomes developed and mixed. The second panel
shows the declining number of fishermen. When the economy becomes devel-
oped their number adjust more quickly to reach the steady state as given in
Table 2.2. The third and fourth panels show the price per unit use right and
the value of use rights per fishermen. Since the per capita capital allowance in-
creases with the declining number of fishermen the value of the use rights per
fishermen increases although its price declines.
Table 2.2 compares the outcomes of the different policies. Any policy that in-
creases the bequest of the first generation affected by the policy as well as the
bequest in the steady state is an intertemporal Pareto improvement, since the
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bequest motions are monotone. All presented policy measures except for ‘de-
velopment redistribution’ are such Pareto improvements. The policy that max-
imizes the average income of the present generation is the ‘maximin redistri-
bution’ that maximizes the incomes of the worst-off (see Proposition 2.4). The
policy that leads to the highest long-run Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is the introduc-
tion of tradable use rights (see Proposition 2.7) with variable capital allowances
that adjust to the number of remaining fishermen, i.e. ‘tradable use rights 2’.
The steady state that evolves from the ‘development redistribution’ and shifts
the underdeveloped economy to a developed economy (ν = n) results in the
unregulated steady state of a mixed developed economy with n∗ = n. Average
incomes in the whole economy and in the resource sector are lower than for the
case of tradable use rights. However, even tradeable use rights set to maximize
the current generations’s fishing income fail to reach the first best solution.
2.6 Conclusion
We have shown that an economy with absent credit markets and unregulated
access to a common pool resource exhibits multiple steady states that differ in
their development level. The more individuals engage in resource harvesting
the smaller is the resource stock and the smaller are the steady state incomes
in the traditional sector. High resource productivity and low costs to enter
the modern sector enable more individuals to escape poverty, thus increasing
the economy’s development level. Further, we have shown that redistributions
among the poor or from the rich to the poor can increase long-run Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency, increase the income of the worst-off individuals, and trigger a process
of development. The same applies for the introduction of resource use regula-
tion in general and tradable use rights in specific. Resource use regulation also
creates a positive resource rent and thus increases the average income above
the income level in unregulated economies, independent of their development
level. Even though there is a multitude of regulation policies for common pool
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resource available (Costello et al., 2010; Grafton et al., 2006), the challenge re-
mains to find and implement the best policy for each specific situation.
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Chapter 3
How Fish Stocks Affect Education in
Indian Villages
Abstract: The study explores the links between resource productivity and edu-
cation using time series and cross section data of a large Indian inland fishery.
It exploits a spatially heterogenous increase of fish landings caused by a large-
scale hydrological manipulation. The results show that educational attainments
increase with fish landings. They further show that the probability of fishermen
leaving the fishery increases with their education level, suggesting that the re-
source productivity increase reduce resource dependency.
3.1 Introduction
Education plays a major role in the occupational choices of the rural poor and
off-farm returns to education often exceed those on-farm by far. (Taylor and
Yunez-Naude, 2000; de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2001; Jolliffe, 2004). However, ru-
ral households are often constrained in their liquidity to invest in education
and thus fail to shift their labor to resource-independent production. (Jensen,
2010; Uchida et al., 2009).1 Positive resource shocks may lessen these financial
1Recent developments in the theoretical work on structural change, credit market imperfec-
tions and investment in education are summarized in Matsuyama (2011).
39
Chapter 3. Resources and Education 40
constraints of the households but they may also provide incentives to remain in
the resource-dependent sector and therefore impede long-run economic devel-
opment (van der Ploeg, 2011). The current article asks the question whether a
positive and persistent resource productivity shock increases investment in ed-
ucation and induces a labor reallocation from resource-dependent to resource-
independent production.
Agricultural shocks may affect schooling in developing countries. Jensen (2000)
showed for the Côte d’Ivoir that negative agricultural shocks decrease invest-
ment in education and Beegle et al. (2006) showed for Tanzania that adverse
agricultural productivity shocks increase child labor and decrease school atten-
dance. Maccini and Yang (2009) used rainfall variations to show that positive
income shocks during the birth year had lasting impacts on individual educa-
tional attainments and incomes in Indonesia but they found no impact of rain-
fall variations in post-birth years on adult outcomes. However, these studies
only regard temporary shocks caused by annual rainfall variation and the re-
sponse of schooling to these shocks.2 In contrast to these articles, the present
study explores the impact of a persistent resource productivity increase on edu-
cational outcomes. It is therefore more related to Foster and Rosenzweig (1996)
who found a positive relationship between long-run agricultural productivity
increase caused by the green revolution and investment in education in rural In-
dia. However, they found substantial returns to education in agriculture (Foster
and Rosenzweig, 1996) and little impact of education on labor reallocation from
agriculture to the manufacturing sector (Foster and Rosenzweig, 2008). These
findings are in contrast to Jolliffe (2004) who provided evidence for much higher
returns to education in off-farm work than in on-farm work and also for a pos-
itive relationship between education and off-farm activities in Ghana. These
studies concern only privately owned resources such as arable land where re-
source externalities play a minor role. Common pool resources are, however,
widespread in the developing world (Dasgupta, 2010; Millennium Ecosystem
2There are similar findings for agricultural price fluctuations and education (Grimm, 2011;
Kruger, 2007).
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Assessment, 2005) and my coauthors and I showed theoretically for a common
pool resource under restricted open access (no harvesting restrictions but lim-
ited entry) that labor reallocation from the resource-dependent to the resource-
independent sector exhibit a positive feedback (Chpater 2). We assumed that
working in the resource-independent sector requires a fixed investment in ed-
ucation, that credit markets are absent (or distorted) and that harvesting re-
duces the resource stock which raises the unit harvesting costs (the common
pool externality). Olale and Henson (2012) reveal this positive relationship be-
tween education and the exit from the fishery empirically in Kenya. The current
study examines the relationship between the productivity of a common pool re-
source, education and the reallocation of labor from the resource-dependent to
the resource-independent sector. It uses time series and cross-sectional data
from Chilika Lagoon, a large Indian inland fishery under restricted open ac-
cess (Sekhar, 2004). The fishery currently comprises 32,500 active fishermen
that annually landed between 10,000 and 20,000 tonnes of fish and shellfish in
the period from 2000 to 2010. Real incomes of the fishermen at Chilika La-
goon have constantly declined during the eighties and reached very low levels
during the nineties. They increased suddenly in 2001 after a large-scale hydro-
logical manipulation of the lagoon (Mohanty et al., 2009; Mohapatra et al., 2007)
and remained at high levels thereafter. In the present study, I use this sudden
and spatially heterogenous productivity shock in a differences-in-differences
framework to show that investment in education increased with the resource
productivity. Further, I show that the probability of traditional fishermen work-
ing in resource-independent occupations increases with their education levels.
This reallocation of labor from resource-dependent to resource-independent
production can be explained by the high returns to education in the resource-
independent sector, which I found in the fishing communities around Chilika
Lagoon.
The article is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides a detailed background
of the Chilika fishery, Section 3.3 describes the data sources and Section 3.4 con-
tains the summary statistics. The relationship between the resource shock and
Chapter 3. Resources and Education 42
FIGURE 3.1: Map of Chilika Lagoon.
Prepared by Petra Sinuraya, modified from CDA.
education is described in Section 3.5 and Section 3.6 gives suggestive evidence
on the relationship of education and occpational choices. Section 4.5 concludes.
3.2 Chilika Lagoon and the Resource Shock
The study uses data from fishing communities of Chilika Lagoon in Orissa, In-
dia. The Chilika fishery currently has 32,500 active fishermen that harvested be-
tween 10,000 to 20,000 tonnes of fish and shellfish annually in the period from
2000 to 2010. Chilika Lagoon is a brackish estuary with large temporal salinity
fluctuations governed by freshwater inflow through the rivers and saltwater
intrusion from the sea. The productivity of the ecosystem depends largely on
the hydrology such that the fish landings vary with the salinity levels (Mohanty
et al., 2009; Mohapatra et al., 2007). The ecological conditions differ across re-
gions of the lagoon which is divided into four ecological sectors (Figure 3.1).
Monitoring by the Chilika Development Authority (CDA) is based on these eco-
logical sectors but the sectors do not coincide with other administrative units.
The northern sector (NS) is located in the Puri and Khurda district and is the
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least saline since the Mahanadi distributaries discharges freshwater into the la-
goon from the North. The central sector (CS) stretches from the Khurda to Puri
district and the southern sector (SS) is situated in the Khordha, Puri and Gan-
jam district. Both sectors have intermediate salinity. The outer channel (OC) in
the Puri district connects the lagoon with the sea and is the most saline sector.
A smaller channel connects the SS to the sea, as well. The length of the outer
channel increased in the decades before 2000 when the strong current in the Bay
of Bengal shifted the sea mouth of the channel to the North-East. The amount
of saltwater which entered the lagoon during high tide declined in this period
and consequently the salinity levels of the lagoon decreased. Further, 75 % of
the harvested fish species are migratory and had to pass through the long chan-
nel, which was blocked by nets and sediments (Ghosh et al., 2006; Mohapatra
et al., 2007). The per capita fish catches declined continuously before the year
2000 and simultaneously the fishing revenues. Figure 3.2 shows the dynamics
of real per capita income, the number of active fishermen, the number of fishing
boats and number of fishermen operating days at Chilika Lagoon. The dotted
line demarcates the year of the excavation of the new sea mouth. Fishermen re-
garded the declining salinity levels as an unsolved problem in 1999 (Samal and
Meher, 2003). Therefore, I assume in the following that the increase in landings
was unforseen by the fishermen. In September 2000, a new sea mouth was ex-
cavated by the CDA that reduced the length of the connecting channel by 18
km. This hydrological intervention increased the salinity level of the lagoon
and opened a new migration route for fish. Salinity levels increased immedi-
ately followed by a steep increase in aggregate landings and revenues within
the next years (Figure 3.2).
However, the increase of landings differed largely between the sectors (Fig-
ure 3.3). Fishermen benefitted least in the SS and OC from the hydrological in-
tervention where the ecological changes were less pronounced. Moreover, fish-
ermen in the SS and OC that used to harvest large quantities of migrating fishes
in the channels were cut off from this opportunity by the hydrological inter-
vention. Aggregate revenues for Chilika Lagoon increased even stronger than
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FIGURE 3.2: Effort and Revenue Dynamics at Chilika Lagoon.
The data stem from the CDA.
FIGURE 3.3: Sector-Wise Harvest Dynamics at Chilika Lagoon.
The landings are normalized to the year 2000. The data are from 12 landing centers for which
data are available for the whole period. The data stem from the CDA.
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landings since valuable species such as large prawns (Penaeus monodon, Pe-
naeus indicus, Macrobrachium spp.) increased disproportionally after the hy-
drological intervention. Also, the average number of operating days increased
after the hydrological intervention which may reflect an increase of individ-
ual effort.3 The number of boats declined due to the Orissa cyclone (Cyclone
05B) in 1999 and never recovered completely afterwards. The strong increase
in boat numbers in 2001 was due to a compensation scheme. Although most
fishing units use boats, they are still relatively immobile since motorization is
low and remained relative constant during the period from 1996 to 2007 rang-
ing between 30 to 40 % of the total fleet (Mohapatra et al., 2007; Pattnaik and
Kobayashi, 2009). Bhatta et al. (2009) equipped fishermen boats with GPS data
loggers over the year 2008 and showed that fishermen fish mainly in proxim-
ity to their village. I will therefore assume henceforward that the harvest of
fishermen depend on the local ecological conditions.
The surveyed fishermen belong almost exclusively to traditional fishing sub-
castes such as Keuta, Kandara, Kartia, Khatia, Tiara and Nolia or traditional
fishermen that immigrated from Bangladesh. The only income source of these
traditional fishermen used to be fishing and each sub-caste used specific fish-
ing methods. This system was in place until the sixties (Jhingran and Natajaran,
1969) but weakened in the following decades (Samal and Meher, 2003). I will
assume in the following, that the default occupation of the respondents is fish-
ing.
I conclude this section by giving a brief overview of the educational structure
in Orissa. Students in Orissa attend primary school from the age of five to the
age of 13 and secondary school from the age of 14 to 15. Primary and secondary
schools are free of charge and compulsory but costs of schooling increase still
with education level (World Bank, 2009) and many children exit the educational
system early (Government of Orissa, 2012). Secondary school is followed by
two years of senior secondary school and several years of tertiary education
3The fluctuations of operation days are due to varying weather conditions that occasionally
keep fishermen from work.
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(see e.g. Bandyopadhyay (2008)). Tertiary education comprises colleges and
other institutions of higher education. I will use this educational structure to
determine the impact of the increase in landings on education in Section 3.5
and to derive the potential experience used in Section 3.6.
3.3 Data
This study is based on a field survey of 599 traditional fishermen households
(Noack and Riekhof, 2011) and on data recorded by the CDA (their method-
ology is described in Chilika Development Authority (2005); Mohanty et al.
(2009); Mohapatra et al. (2007)). The survey took place from February to April
2011. 502 traditional fishermen households with 2,923 individuals were inter-
viewed in a general survey according to stratified random sampling. In ad-
dition, 97 traditional fishermen households with non-fishing income sources
comprising 701 individuals were interviewed. The fishermen population was
stratified geographically into four ecological sectors (NS, CS, SS, OC) and the
population of each sector was stratified again according to the size of the settle-
ments based on the data of Pattnaik and Kobayashi (2009). Settlements with less
than 100 households were classified as small and settlements above this num-
ber as large. The sample size was proportional to the number of households in
each stratum.
Sampling was done in two stages. In the first stage fishermen settlements were
randomly selected. The probability of a settlement to be selected was propor-
tional to its size. Once the settlement was chosen, we started at a random point
and surveyed every xth household where ‘x’ is the number of households per
settlement divided by the target number of interviews per settlement. There-
fore, each household of the fishermen population had the same probability
of being selected. The additional households with alternative income sources
were chosen with the help of the community leaders.
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The household head or representative was interviewed but further household
members were encouraged to help answer the questions. The questions con-
cern household members who currently live in the household and individuals
that left the household within the last twenty years. However, there is no in-
formation about complete households that left the fishing communities. Dis-
cussions with the community leaders revealed that the migration of complete
households is almost absent although commuting and seasonal migration of
household members increased in recent times. I assume, therefore, in the fol-
lowing, that I have the relevant information on all individuals that lived in the
area during the last 20 years.
3.4 Summary Statistics
In this section I report the educational situation and the occupations of the
surveyed households. Education levels are low and dropout rates are high in
the fishing communities around Chilika Lagoon (Table 3.1). About one fifth of
the population has no formal education, whereas 58 % of the population com-
pleted primary school and 23 % attended but never completed primary school.
Women generally have lower education levels than men and this gap increases
with the education level. Only 10 % of the men and 4 % of the women have
completed tertiary education (Table 3.1). Noack and Riekhof (2011) also asked
for the reason why individuals did not attain higher education levels and 65
% of the respondents stated that they could not afford it. Only 12 % of the re-
spondents stated that the family was not interested and 10 % stated that the
student was not interested in attaining higher levels of education. Although 86
% of the fishermen households have outstanding loans, less than 3 % of these
credits are used for educational purpose (Noack and Riekhof, 2011). Credits are
mainly provided by informal money lenders and fish traders (50 % of the cred-
its) and are tied to fishing activities. Microfinance institutions have increased
their market share in recent times and provide 25 % of the credits but the money
is conditional to productive investments with short-term returns (also mainly
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TABLE 3.1: Education.
NS CS SS OC total
Primary education (age > 13)
Completion [%] 56 59 60 53 58
Dropout [%] 27 23 21 22 23
Completion men [%] 61 60 66 61 62
Completion women [%] 49 57 51 40 50
Secondary education (age > 15)
Completion [%] 35 38 41 36 42
Dropouts [%] 13 14 13 12 13
Completion men [%] 41 40 49 41 43
Completion women [%] 26 35 30 28 30
Senior secondary education (age > 17 )
Completion men [%] 24 25 34 26 27
Completion women [%] 15 22 20 16 18
Tertiary education (age > 24 )
Completion men [%] 11 11 10 8 10
Completion women [%] 3 5 5 2 4
Notes: All calculations are based on the general survey with 2,923 individuals.
fishing activities). The possibility to finance education by borrowing is therefore
limited and the households rely mainly on current incomes to cover the costs of
education. I will describe the impact of incomes on educational achievements in
Section 3.5 using a differences-in-differences approach. Most men earn positive
incomes but only 5 % of the women participate in the labor force (Table 3.2).
The vast majority of men work in the fishery while most women with posi-
tive incomes have non-fishing occupations. Average incomes in the non-fishing
sectors are higher than incomes in the fishing sector. However, incomes include
the cost of capital depreciation such that incomes from self-employment are
probably biased upwards. Income levels across sectors with different shares of
self-employment are therefore difficult to compare. I will review the impact of
education on occupational choices and earnings in Section 3.6.
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TABLE 3.2: Occupations and Income.
NS CS SS OC total
Occupation men
Labor force participation [%] 92 98 95 94 95
Fishing [%] 86 95 85 86 88
Non-fishing [%] 6 3 10 8 7
Occupation women
Labor force participation [%] 3 6 8 1 5
Fishing [%] 1 0 1 0 1
Non-fishing [%] 2 6 7 1 4
Income men
Total [Rs/day] 97 123 98 102 104
Fishing [Rs/day] 95 115 91 92 96
Non-fishing [Rs/day] 125 263 157 211 167
Working days [days/year] 202 245 290 241 244
Income women
Total [Rs/day] 118 84 88 70 92
Fishing [Rs/day] 113 - 50 - 92
Non-fishing [Rs/day] 139 87 93 70 93
Working days [days/year] 173 231 246 360 237
All calculations are based on the general survey.
Only the most important income sources of individuals of age between 25 and 65
years are included.
Individuals with incomes between 0 and 20 Rs per day are excluded from the sam-
ple to include only full-time workers.
3.5 Resources and Education
In this section, I will explain the impact of the hydrological intervention and the
subsequent resource productivity increase on educational achievements. Few
individuals attained senior secondary and tertiary education and the impact of
the resource productivity increase on senior secondary and tertiary education
cannot be measured with precision. I will concentrate henceforward on primary
and secondary education.
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3.5.1 Identification Strategy
To identify the impact of the resource productivity increase on education I use
a difference-in-difference approach to exploit the spatial heterogeneity of the
increase in landings. The impact of the resource shock on the educational out-
comes yijk of individual i in sector j and age group a was estimated by
yija = α1 shock j × posta + α2 posta + α′3 Sectorj + α′4 Xija + εija, (3.1)
where shock measures the average sector-wise increase of fish harvest relative
to the baseline year of 2000, post indicates whether an individual was educated
in the period that followed the resource productivity increase, Sector is a vector
of regional dummies and Xijt is a vector of individual controls that include age,
sex and sub-caste dummies. The parameter of interest, α1, measures the im-
pact of resource productivity increase on education. The other variables control
for general time trends in education, regional differences and individual char-
acteristics. The SS is used as reference sector since it was least affected by the
hydrological intervention and has intermediate socioeconomic characteristics
(Figure 3.3 and Table 3.1 and 3.6).
To measure the exposure of individuals to the resource shock I use the aver-
age increase of sector-wise landings compared to the baseline year of 2000. The
boundaries of the ecological sectors do not coincide with administrative bound-
aries such that the effect of increasing landings is not confounded with regional
education policies. I use the average increase of landings instead of annual
changes since educational achievements are more responsive to average income
levels than to current income levels (Dahl and Lochner, 2012). The single ref-
erence year that is used to measure the increase in landings is because no ear-
lier reginal catch data are available. However, this may not change the results
qualitatively since the landings were relatively constant in the pre-intervention
period and did not increase until 2001 (see Figure 3.2). The productivity in-
crease was caused by the hydrological intervention although the subsequent
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adjustment of fishing effort may also affect the aggregate fish landings (see Fig-
ure 3.2). However, the trend is not reversed by this bias since the average per
capita fishing income was highest in the OC and SS in 1999 (Samal and Meher,
1999) and became highest in the NS and CS after the hydrological intervention
(see Table 3.6).
The educational achievements are measured in primary and secondary school
enrollment and completion. Dropout rates are very high in the fishing commu-
nities around Chilika Lagoon (see Table 3.1) such that school completion is the
outcome of successive decisions to stay in school or to discontinue education. In
a first approach, I therefore test whether school completion of individuals that
were of school age or younger at the time of the resource productivity increase
was affected. In a second approach, I test whether the share of children that
ever went to school changed through the resource productivity increase. In this
approach I compare the probability of individuals being enrolled at least once
between cohorts that entered school age after the resource shock to cohorts that
entered school age before the resource shock.
To define the group of individuals that were affected in their educational choices
by the resource shock and the group of individuals that were not affected in
their educational choices by the resource shock I use two successive age interval
of 10 years. Individuals in the first age interval made their educational choices
before the resource productivity shock and individuals in the second interval
made their educational choices after the resource productivity shock. Ten years
is the maximum interval such that all individuals in one group were exposed to
a similar resource productivity and could have been enrolled in or completed
the respective eduction level by the time of the survey. These considerations
lead to the groups defined in Table 3.3.
Similar to Cutler et al. (2010) and Grimm (2011), I use OLS for an easy inter-
pretation of the interaction terms.4 Further, I cluster the standard errors at the
4See Ai and Norton (2003) and Puhani (2012) for the interpretation of interaction terms in
nonlinear models and Angrist and Pischke (2008) for a discussion of using OLS with binary
data.
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TABLE 3.3: Affected and Unaffected Groups.
Primary School (PS) Secondary School (SS)
Enrollment Completion Enrollment Completion
affected group [age in 2001] <6 4-13 4-13 6-15
unaffected group [age in 2001] 6-15 14-23 14-24 16-25
household level to account for correlated educational decisions among siblings.
3.5.2 Results
In the following I present the OLS estimates of the impact of the resource pro-
ductivity increase on education. The results for (3.1) are given in Table 3.4.
TABLE 3.4: Resource Productivity and Education.
Primary Secondary Senior Secondary College
Enrollment Completion Enrollment Completion Completion Completion
shock j × posta -0.030 0.121 0.131 0.096 -0.030 -0.016
(0.023) (0.045)*** (0.047)*** (0.052)* (0.049) (0.028)
Observations 1138 1021 976 986 907 683
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the household level.
All regressions include sector fixed effects and treatment fixed effects and control for age, age squared, gender and
sub caste at the individual level.
*** Significant at the 1 % level,
** Significant at the 5 % level,
* Significant at the 10 % level.
A doubling of the fish landings increased the probability to complete primary
school by 12 %, to enroll for secondary school by 13 % and to complete sec-
ondary school by 10 %. These results establish a strong and positive rela-
tionship between resource productivity and education. However, the resource
shock had no significant impact on the probability to enroll in primary school
which is not surprising as the enrollment was close to 100% by the time of the
shock. Further it had no impact on the share of individuals with completed pri-
mary education to enroll in or complete secondary school. These results suggest
that the resource shock affected primary school dropout rates but not the prob-
ability to continue education after primary school. However, the total number
of individuals that attended secondary school increased significantly after the
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resource increase. An explanation for why the resource productivity increase
had the largest impact on primary school dropout rates is that older children
became more productive in the fishery after the resource productivity shock
such that the opportunity costs of schooling increased more than proportion-
ally with the age of children. This may also explain why there are no significant
results for senior secondary and tertiary education.
3.5.3 Robustness
In this section I show how a variation of the age thresholds that define the treat-
ment and control groups affect the parameter estimates of (3.1). Age heaping as
in Cutler et al. (2010) of ages that end with 0, 2, 5 and 8 occurs also in this survey
and general time trends in education that correlate spatially with the resource
productivity increase could possibly confound the results. In the following, I
show how the estimated effect of resource productivity on education changes
in response to varying age thresholds. The results are robust if the point esti-
mates converge smoothly to zero as the age thresholds, that define the treatment
and control groups diverge from the values which are given in Table 3.3.
Figure 3.4 depicts the point estimate and the confidence interval of the interac-
tion term in dependence of the age thresholds. The solid lines show the param-
eter estimate of the interaction term (shock j× posta) with respect to a shift of the
age thresholds that define the treatment and control groups. The dotted line is
the confidence interval at the 95 % level. The fluctuations in the estimates as the
age thresholds vary are probably due to age heaping but have no impact on the
qualitative results. Figure 3.4 shows that the results are robust with respect to
the age thresholds.
The increase in aggregate education could also be the consequence of the cy-
clone in 1999 and the resulting surplus labor. The damage of the cyclone was,
however, spatially uncorrelated with the increase in fish landings such that the
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FIGURE 3.4: Robustness.
effect of the cyclone is captured by the cohort dummy and not by the interaction
term.
Another possible explanation for the resource shock is that the cyclone de-
stroyed a large number of boats which led to a strong reduction of fishing effort.
Reducing fishing effort may increase landings if the fish stock was heavily over-
fished previously (Clark, 2005). Since the cyclone was also exogenous, the cause
of the productivity shock does not matter for the results.
3.6 Education and Occupational Choice
In this section, I test the impact of education on occupational choices and in-
come in the fishery and the non-fishery sector to explain the impact of the
resource productivity shock on labor reallocation. The surveyed households
belong to traditional fishermen sub-castes such that a fishermen with a non-
fishing (and also non-agricultural) occupation indicates a labor reallocation from
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resource-dependent to the resource-independent production. I follow the ap-
proach of Taylor and Yunez-Naude (2000) and use a two stage Heckit procedure
(Wooldridge, 2001) to determine the impact of education on activity choice and
income. The probability of individual i in household j and sector k to engage in
activity l is estimated by
P(yijkl > 0) = Φ(β1 Educationijk + β′2 Xij + β′3 Zjk + β′4 Sectork + εˆijkl), (3.2)
where yijkl is the daily revenues from activity l,Φ is the probit function, Educationijk
is a vector of dummies that indicate the education levels that the individual
completed (primary dropout, primary completion, secondary dropout, secondary
completion, senior secondary completion, tertiary completion) and Xij is a vec-
tor of individual controls including potential experience, potential experience
squared, gender and dummies that indicate the individuals’ kinship to the house-
hold head (household head, his wife, son 1, son 2, son 3, daughter, daughter-
in-law, father, mother, brother, sister). The parameter of interest is β1 which in-
dicates the effect of education on the probability to participate in activity l. The
education levels are additive which implies that an individual has completed all
education levels below the one which was indicated in the questionnaire. The
potential experience is the number of years an individual could have worked,
assuming that the individual reached the education level in the scheduled time
(see Section 3.2) and started immediately working thereafter (Card, 1999). I use
the kinship to the household head to correct for selection bias assuming that it
affects the occupational choice more than the income. The vector Zjk, indicates
whether the household owns a fishing boat, a boat engine and the size of land
that the household owns. Further, I control for sector fixed effects denoted by
Sectork. The errors are clustered again at the household level and the error term
is denoted by εˆijka. I use (3.2) firstly to estimate the probability of individuals to
earn an income that exceeds 20 Rupees (Rs)5 per day, and secondly to estimate
the probability of individuals to participate either in fishing or non-fishing ac-
tivities conditional on labor force participation. The threshold of 20 Rs excludes
5All values are given in 2011 Rupees.
Chapter 3. Resources and Education 56
part-time workers but the exact level (± 20 Rs) has no impact on the qualitative
result. The results are shown in Table 3.5.
TABLE 3.5: Education and Activity Choice.
Labor Force Participation Non-Fishing
Primary dropout 0.062 0.342
(0.215) (0.284)
Primary completion 0.138 -0.386
(0.339) (0.625)
Secondary dropout -0.079 0.612
(0.345) (0.613)
Secondary completion -0.087 1.005
(0.336) (0.601)*
Senior secondary completion -0.072 0.602
(0.217) (0.286)***
Tertiary completion -0.060 1.017
(0.273) (0.288)***
n 1053 563
Notes: Individuals between 25 and 65 years with either no income or income
that equals or exceed 20 Rs per day are included in the regression.
Standard errors are clustered at the household level and are given in paren-
theses.
All regressions include sector fixed effects, individual controls (potential
experience, potential experience squared, gender) and household controls
(fishing boat, boat engine, land size)(not displayed).
All regressions include dummies that indicate the kinship of the individual
to the household head (himself, wife, son 1, son 2, son 3, daughter, daughter-
in-law, father, mother, brother, sister)(not displayed).
*** Significant at the 1 % level,
** Significant at the 5 % level,
* Significant at the 10 % level.
From the 1053 individuals in the age range with complete data, 563 had a pos-
itive income. Education had no significant effect on labor force participation in
general. Among the men, household heads and sons are more likely to partic-
ipate in income generating activities and among the women, the wives of the
household heads and their daughters are less likely to participate in income
generating activities than average individuals (not displayed in Table 3.5). In-
dividuals with higher education levels are more likely to engage in non-fishing
activities than in fishing activities. The average of the sample marginal effects
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on the probability to participate in non-fishing activities are -0.08 for completed
primary education, 0.15 for completed secondary education, 0.12 for completed
senior secondary education and 0.13 for completed tertiary education.6 Adding
these effects yields the marginal effect of an education level on the probability
to work outside the fishery.
In a second step, I test whether the returns to education are higher in non-
fishing occupations than in the fishery. Higher returns to education in the
non-fishing sector can explain why the probability to work in non-fishing oc-
cupations increases with the education level. To test the impact of education on
income I regress log daily incomes in fishing and non-fishing occupations on
education and individual, household and regional controls using
log(yijkl) = γ1 Educationijk + γ′2 X¯ijk + γ′3 Zjk + γ′4 Sectork + γ5 imrijkl + ε¯ijkl.
(3.3)
The vector X¯ijk contains potential experience, potential experience squared and
gender. The term imr is the inverse Mills ratio from (3.2) and e¯ijkl is the error
term. The other variables are as described for (3.2). The parameter of interest is
γ1 and measures the impact of an additional education level on income. I run
this regression for all occupations and fishermen and non-fishermen incomes
separately. Incomes include the costs of capital depreciation and are therefore
biased towards incomes from self-owned businesses with high investment costs
such as fishing (see Section 3.4). However, the returns to education are probably
unaffected from this bias. The results of (3.3) are summarized in Table 3.6.
There are positive returns to primary, senior secondary and college education
as shown in the first column of Table 3.6. Primary school completion increases
incomes by approximately 30% (0.101+0.179), secondary education yields no fi-
nancial returns but senior secondary school completion and college completion
increase incomes by 40% or 65% respectively. However, the effects are mainly
6The OLS estimates are -0.03, 0.09, 0.19, and 0.28 respectively.
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TABLE 3.6: Education and Income.
Total Fishing Non-fishing
income income income
Constant 2.334 3.909 2.987
(0.508)*** (0.539)*** (0.477)***
Primary school dropout 0.101 0.017 0.346
(0.061)* (0.056) (0.270)
Primary school completion 0.179 0.058 1.361
(0.104)* (0.075) (0.433)***
Secondary school dropout -0.181 -0.087 -0.871
(0.119) (0.086) (0.326)***
Secondary school completion -0.066 -0.069 -0.688
(0.122) (0.084) (0.273)**
Senior secondary school completion 0.359 -0.088 0.779
(0.127)*** (0.085) (0.223)***
Tertiary education 0.260 -0.035 -0.192
(0.167) (0.137) (0.250)
Potential experience 0.047 0.018 0.080
(0.012)*** (0.010)* (0.025)**
Potential experience squared -0.0008 -0.0004 -0.0011
(0.0002)*** (0.0001)** (0.0004)**
imr 0.775 0.178 -0.230
(0.218)*** (0.133) 0.142
n 522 406 109
Notes: Individuals between the age of 25 and 65 years with either no in-
come or incomes that equals or exceed 20 Rs per day are included in the
regression.
Standard errors are clustered at the household level and are given in paren-
theses.
All regressions include sector fixed effects, individual controls (potential
experience, potential experience squared, gender) and household controls
(fishing boat, boat engine, land size)(not displayed).
*** Significant at the 1 % level,
** Significant at the 5 % level,
* Significant at the 10 % level.
driven by the higher base income in the fishery sector, the high returns to edu-
cation in the non-fishery sector and the self selection of individuals with higher
education into the non-fishery sector. Individuals with completed secondary
education are more likely to work outside the fishery where their incomes are
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70 % higher than the incomes of individuals without formal education.7 These
results show that increasing education levels can induce a labor reallocation to
resource-independent production. This labor reallocation can be explained by
differences in the returns to education between both sectors.8
3.7 Conclusions and Discussion
This study explores the link between education and natural resources, using
data from an Indian inland fishery. Rising resource productivity increases in-
vestment in education and more educated individuals are more likely to work
in the resource-independent sector where they earn higher incomes. These re-
sults suggest that low incomes in the resource-dependent sector cause low lev-
els of investment in education, which impedes the transition from a resource-
dependent to a resource-independent economy. There are several possible ex-
planations for this poverty trap, such as fixed costs of education (Chpater 2),
the failure of parents to internalize the full benefits of education, or high dis-
count rates that reduce the present value of future returns to education (Baland
and Robinson, 2000). Further research is needed, however, to explain the link
between parental incomes and the educational achievements of their children
in poor, rural economies.
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Chapter 4
When will Higher Interest Payments
Lead to More Education?
with Marie-Catherine Riekhof
Abstract: Based on observations from field studies in fishing communities in In-
dia, we include a fragmented credit market into a two-sector, two-period model
with common pool externalities to establish conditions under which credit mar-
ket distortions either increase or decrease education. We show that higher in-
terest payments increase education if their negative effect on capital investment
and therefore labor productivity in low-skilled production outweighs their pos-
itive effect on subjective discounting and therefore the present value of high-
skilled production. Positive common pool externalities from reduced capital
investment in low-skilled production can counterbalance the impact of capi-
tal changes on low-skilled labor productivity and therefore on education. The
overall outcome depends on the affected interest factor, the household’s initial
wealth and the common pool externality.
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4.1 Introduction
One of the most pressing global challenges is poverty reduction. In addressing
this challenge, a focus on human capital formation is one of the most promis-
ing approaches (Lucas, 1988; Galor, 2011a; Hanushek and Woessmann, 2008;
Becker et al., 2011). Although there are substantial returns to education, rang-
ing from 7 to 20 % increase in income per year of schooling (Psacharopoulos and
Patrinos, 2004; Duflo, 2001; Banerjee and Duflo, 2005), education levels are still
low in most developing countries and cause 20 % of the cross-country differ-
ences in output per worker (Schoellman, 2012). Many children and adolescents
contribute to the household’s income instead of going to school, partly because
credit markets for the poor are informal, fragmented and cannot facilitate opti-
mal investment allocation (Banerjee and Duflo, 2005). Households may invest
too little in education if the direct and opportunity costs of education are high
and credit markets are absent (Baland and Robinson, 2000; Ranjan, 1999, 2001)
but improved credit markets do not necessarily lead to more education. Empir-
ical evidence is mixed. While Dehejia and Gatti (2005) and Beegle et al. (2006)
suggest that improving credit markets increases investment in education and
reduces child labor, Islam and Choe (2013) and Maldonado and González-Vega
(2008) show that increasing access to credits increases child labor and reduces
investment in education. Banerjee et al. (2010) find no effect of microcredit on
education, while Holvoet (2004) finds positive effects of microfinance on edu-
cation but only if the loans are received through a women’s group.
Fragmented credit markets and poorly defined property rights often co-exist
in developing economies (Banerjee and Duflo, 2005) and many of the globally
poor depend on common pool resources such as rangelands, forests and fish
stocks for their incomes (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005; Dasgupta,
2010). The occupational choices of the individuals are therefore often inter-
dependent via common pool externalities. Growing resource-dependent pro-
duction may induce resource degradation and impose a negative externality
on the resource users. Labor reallocation from the resource-dependent to the
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resource-independent sector may increase the resource abundance and thus the
productivity of the resource-dependent sector.
We argue in this paper that the effect of credit market improvements on ed-
ucation depends a) on the affected interest factor, b) on the initial wealth of
the household and c) on the presence of common pool externalities. Based on
observations from our field study on fishing communities around Chilika la-
goon, India, we include a fragmented credit market into a two sector, two pe-
riod model with common pool externalities to establish conditions under which
credit market improvements either increase or decrease education.
Informal credit markets around Chilika lagoon consist of three main segments.
Money lenders offer loans not tied to a special purpose at high interest rates.
Fish traders, and to a lesser extent microfinance organizations and cooperatives,
offer lower priced loans for tangible business investments, where the produc-
tive investments serve as collateral. Since human capital cannot be seized in
case of default, higher future income due to education does not count as col-
lateral. The third segment comprises saving, but it is poorly developed. Credit
markets around Chilika lagoon are not exceptional. Credit markets in develop-
ing countries are often distorted and interest rates differ depending on the pur-
pose of the loan and the lender (Bardhan and Udry, 1999, , Chapter 7). Credit
markets are also often interlinked with other markets (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990;
Ghosh et al., 2000) especially when debtor and creditor are interdependent in
trade and production (Basu, 1997). Our model includes a low interest rate for
saving, an intermediate interest rate for borrowing secured by a seizable col-
lateral in form of a business investment and a high interest rate for unsecured
borrowing to capture the fragmented credit markets.
Our model is close to the model of Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011) who in-
clude two different loan types in their model, but allow a higher future income
due to education as collateral. Jafarey and Lahiri (2002) also study the impact
of credit market distortions on child labor but their focus is on the effectiveness
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of trade sanctions to reduce child labor. Further, our approach resembles Du-
mas (2013), who analyzes the effects of market imperfections on child labor but
in contrast to our study focuses on labor market imperfection and adapts an
empirical approach to determine the sign of the unclear effects. Also, Bhalotra
and Heady (2003) find that land holdings increase child labor but as far as we
know only Bluffstone (2008) discusses child labor and common pool resources.
He finds that improved common property forest management increases child
labor.
Our results show that the activity of the representative household on the credit
market depends on its initial wealth. The household saves for very high levels
of initial wealth and becomes inactive on the financial market if its initial wealth
falls below a certain level. The household borrows money for the low interest
factor to invest in low-skilled production if the initial wealth reduces further.
The household borrows money for investment and consumption using secured
and unsecured credits if it is endowed with comparably very low levels of initial
wealth. The main results are that changes in the interest factors have different
effects on the household’s time allocation depending on its wealth level, the in-
terest factor and the common pool externality. A very poor household increases
education if the unsecured interest factor decreases but reduces education if the
secured interest factor decreases. The latter result becomes ambiguous in the
presence of common pool externalities. The effect of a decreasing secured in-
terest factor on time allocation is ambiguous if the household uses only loans
secured by a collateral. The same holds true for changes in the interest factor for
saving for rich households that save. Results now depend on the partial output
elasticities, the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in the low-
skilled sector, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution as well as the interest
factor.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the
model framework and Section 4.3 presents the results without common pool
resources. Section 4.4 introduces a common pool resource and presents the new
results. Section 4.5 concludes.
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4.2 The Model
We consider a two-period model of an economy with distorted credit markets
and a high-skilled as well as a low-skilled sector. A representative household
inelastically supplies one unit of labor each period. The household allocates
labor between low-skilled production and education in the first period and be-
tween low- and high-skilled production in the second period. We assume that
education is a prerequisite for working in the high-skilled sector. The share of
labor allocated to education in the first period equals therefore the share of time
allocated to high-skilled production in the second period and the time share
allocated to low-skilled production is also the same in both periods. In the fol-
lowing, we describe production, markets and the household in more detail.
4.2.1 Production
Production in the low-skilled sector uses physical capital k and labor l. The
low-skilled sector produces output h(l, k) using a strictly increasing and strictly
concave technology that satisfies the Inada conditions. Production in the high-
skilled sector uses educated labor b as input with the production technology
w(b) and b = 1− l. The production technology w is also strictly increasing and
strictly concave and satisfies the Inada conditions.
4.2.2 Markets
Demand for output is perfectly elastic at constant prices. Labor markets are
nonexistent for low-skilled labor, while credit markets are present but distorted.
The household chooses the amount s ≥ 0 it saves at a fixed interest factor φ, the
amount it borrows v ≥ 0 constrained by the collateral k according to
v ≤ k (4.1)
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at the fixed interest factor τ, and the amount z ≥ 0 it borrows at the fixed
interest factor ι, with
1 < φ < τ < ι < ∞. (4.2)
The investment in physical capital constrains the loan size v at the intermedi-
ate interest factor τ. The unsecured loan z reflects the possibility for a second,
unconstrained, but higher-priced loan. In other words, credit supply is per-
fectly elastic at the interest factor τ as long as the capital investment serves
as collateral. For a loan that exceeds the capital investment, credit supply is
perfectly elastic at the higher interest factor ι. We use the simplification of un-
constrained borrowing without collateral to focus on the secured loan, but to
still capture the fragmented nature of the credit market. Furthermore, we ab-
stract from asymmetric information which may cause moral hazard or adverse
selection. We suppose that the threat of taking away the productive investment
poses enough incentives to repay the loan.
4.2.3 The Representative Household
The household is endowed with exogenously given initial wealth κ ≥ 0 and one
unit of labor per period. Following Jafarey and Lahiri (2002) and Bhalotra and
Heady (2003) we model the household as a single decision maker and abstract
from intra-household bargaining on time allocation. One interpretation is that
the household head sees schooling as an investment and decides on how much
to invest such that there is a trade-off between child labor and schooling. We
abstract from other educational costs.
The household can invest in physical capital for the low-skilled activity at the
beginning of the first period. Capital lasts without depreciation until the end of
the second period and depreciates completely thereafter. This way, the invest-
ment represents a durable good that lenders allow as collateral.
The household has strictly convex, strictly monotone and homothetic prefer-
ences. Preferences can thus be represented by a strictly quasi-concave and linear
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homogeneous utility function u(c1, c2) that is strictly increasing in consumption
in period one, c1, and period two, c2 and satisfies the Inada conditions. All in-
comes, capital, loans, savings and initial wealth are measured in units of the
consumption good.
The household maximizes utility u(c1, c2) subject to
c1 + k + s ≤ h(l, k) + κ + v + z
c2 + τv + ιz ≤ h(l, k) + w(1− l) + φs,
v ≤ k
(4.3)
with non-negative variables k, v, l, s, z, c1, and c2. The corresponding La-
grangian is
y(c1, c2, l, k, v, z, s,λ1,λ2,λ3) = u(c1, c2)
+ λ1[h(l, k) + κ + v + z− c1 − k− s]
+ λ2[h(l, k) + w(1− l) + φs− c2 − τv− ιz]
+ λ3(k− v)
(4.4)
with shadow prices for consumption λ1 and λ2 in the first and second period,
respectively, and shadow price λ3 for the capital constraint of the secured loan.
In the next section we derive the optimal solution.
4.2.4 Optimality Conditions
In the following, we omit the arguments of the functions writing h instead of
h(l, k) and so on. Further, we use subscripts to denote partial derivatives. For
marginal utilities we write u1 for ∂u/∂c1 and u2 for ∂u/∂c2. The Kuhn-Tucker
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optimality conditions are
u1 − λ1 = 0
u2 − λ2 = 0
λ1hl + λ2(hl + wl) = 0
λ1(hk − 1) + λ2hk + λ3 = 0
λ1 − λ2τ − λ3 ≤ 0, v ≥ 0, v(λ1 − λ2τ − λ3) = 0
λ1 − λ2ι ≤ 0, z ≥ 0, z(λ1 − λ2ι) = 0
− λ1 + λ2φ ≤ 0, s ≥ 0, s(−λ1 + λ2φ) = 0
h + v + z + κ − c1 − s− k ≥ 0, λ1 ≥ 0, λ1(h + v + z + κ − c1 − s− k) = 0
h + w + sφ− c2 − vτ − zι ≥ 0, λ2 ≥ 0, λ2(h + w + sφ− c2 − vτ − zι) = 0
k− v ≥ 0, λ3 ≥ 0, λ3(k− v) = 0,
(4.5)
where the equality of the first four conditions follows from the Inada conditions.
We define the household’s consumption discount factor as
f :=
u1
u2
=
λ1
λ2
(4.6)
that displays the price, in terms of period two goods, for an extra unit of a
period one good the household is willing to pay to shift a marginal income unit
between periods. It equals the relevant market interest factor if the household
is not credit constrained.
The household’s discount factor depends on its initial wealth level. A poorer
household has a higher discount factor and will borrow even at high interest
costs. A richer household has a lower discount factor, may not borrow but
may save. The model features five possible credit regimes that are related to
the initial wealth level. The resulting discount factors are depicted in Figure
4.1. The different credit regimes follow from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (see
Appendix B.1) and will be described in the following.
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FIGURE 4.1: Discounting, Credit Market Regimes and Initial Wealth.
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The proof is given in Appendix B.2
The five credit regimes from low to high initial wealth:
1. Two loans regime (TL): z > 0, v = k, s = 0, f = ι, and λ3λ2 = ι− τ: The
household exhausts the secured loan and takes out an additional loan.
2. Exhausted loan regime (EL): z = 0, v = k, s = 0, τ ≤ f ≤ ι, and
λ3
λ2
= f − τ: The household exhausts the secured loan but does not take
an additional loan.
3. One loan regime (OL): z = 0, k > v > 0, s = 0, f = τ, and λ3 = 0: The
household takes out a secured loan, but does not exhaust it.
4. No credit market activities regime (NO): z = 0, v = 0, s = 0, φ ≤ f ≤ τ,
and λ3 = 0: The household neither borrows nor lends.
5. Saving regime (SA): z = 0, v = 0, s > 0, f = φ, and λ3 = 0: The household
saves.
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Obviously, the household does not save and borrow at the same time. Starting
in the TL-regime, a relatively richer household has a smaller unsecured loan
compared to a poorer household in the TL-regime such that for both f = ι
(compare Figure 4.1). For some wealth level, the EL-regime is reached. Then,
labor allocation and capital investment and therefore the secured loan as well
differ depending on initial wealth. The richer the household, the smaller the
household’s discount factor until the OL-regime is reached. In the OL-regime,
the size of the secured loan depends on initial wealth and keeps f = τ. In the
NO-regime, k and l vary again for different initial wealth levels. If the initial
wealth of the household is large, saving becomes the optimal choice and the
household is in the SA regime. The amount saved depends on initial wealth
such that f = φ.
In other words, credit demand declines from v = k and z > 0, to v = k and
z = 0, to k > v > 0 and z = 0 as the household’s discount factor decreases
from f = ι to ι ≥ f ≥ τ to f = τ. As the household’s discount factor decreases
further, the household does not use the credit market until f = φ, when it starts
to save. While all five credit regimes can theoretically occur, it depends on the
parameter combinations if all regimes occur for positive and finite initial wealth
levels.
Optimal capital investment and labor allocation depend on the subjective dis-
count factor as depicted by the first order conditions
hl(1+ f )− w1−l = 0,
hk(1+ f )− τ = 0 for the TL-, EL- and OL- regimes and
hk(1+ f )− f = 0 for the NO- and SA-regimes.
(4.7)
The condition for optimal labor allocation applies in all credit-regimes while the
first first order condition for capital investment only applies in the TL-, EL-, and
OL-regime and the second only applies only in the NO-, and SA-regime. The
first order condition for labor equates the discounted marginal returns to labor
in low-skilled production with returns to labor in high-skilled production. The
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first order conditions for capital equate marginal discounted returns of capital
in low-skilled production with the marginal costs of capital. Capital investment
and labor allocation differ between the credit regimes.
4.3 Interest Factors and Labor Allocation
In this section we analyze the impact of credit market improvements in the form
of lower interest factors on time allocation between low-skilled labor and edu-
cation. Lower interest factors increase welfare of the indebted household by
decreasing interest payments. However, resulting changes in education levels
may affect future generations negatively as lower education leads to lower fu-
ture incomes and the household head neither considers the full adult life of his
children nor future generations.
We consider how changes in ι, τ and φ affect education in the five different
credit regimes. Since education is defined as 1− l, changes in education and
low-skilled work, l, have opposite signs. We introduce α := hl l/h as the output
elasticity of labor in low-skilled production and 1− α := hkk/h as the output
elasticities of capital in low-skilled production. Further, we define the elasticity
of substitution between capital and labor in low-skilled production by
σ :=
d ln(l/k)
d ln(hk/hl)
and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption by
η :=
d ln(c2/c1)
d ln(u1/u2)
.
To determine the direction of change in low-skilled work due to a change in
interest factors we take the total differential of the first order conditions (4.7)
and reduce it to
sgn
(
dl j
di
)
= sgn(−y∗liy∗kk + y∗kiy∗lk), (4.8)
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TABLE 4.1: Low-Skilled Work and Interest Factor Changes.
Credit Regime sgn (dl/dι) sgn (dl/dτ) sgn (dl/dφ)
TL >0 <0 =0
EL =0 =sgn
(
σ
(
f+ c2c1
1+ f
)
− 1− ηc2f h
)
=0
OL =0 = sgn
(
τ − 1−αα
)
=0
NO =0 =0 =0
SA =0 =0 =sgn
(
φ− 1−αα
)
The proofs are in the Appendix B.4.
where l j denotes the time allocated to low-skilled work in credit regime j ∈
{TL, EL, OL, NO, SA}, the interest factors are given by i ∈ {φ, τ, ι} and y∗ de-
notes the maximized Lagrangian with first derivatives y∗l and y
∗
k . Appendix B.3
provides a detailed derivation of the expression. The results for dl j/di are sum-
marized in Table 4.1 and differ depending on the credit regime and the affected
interest factor (see Appendix B.4 for a detailed derivation).
The following mechanisms determine the results. A change in an interest fac-
tor may affect the costs of capital as well as discounting. The former leads to a
change in production patterns, while the latter may affect both production and
consumption. We identify three effects that determine the direction of change
in labor allocation and term them ‘productivity effect’ (a change in production
patterns due to a change in capital costs), ‘intertemporal effect’ (a change in pro-
duction patterns due to a change in discounting), and ‘credit constraint effect’
(a change in consumption pattern due to a change in discounting).
The productivity effect captures the impact of changes in capital investment
on labor productivity in the low-skilled sector. Capital investment adjusts to
changes in its market price τ (in the TL-,EL-,OL-regimes) or opportunity costs
φ (in the SA-regime). If the interest factor for saving φ increases, saving will
become more attractive relative to investment in the low-skilled sector. If capital
costs τ or opportunity costs of capital φ increase, capital investment and thus
low-skilled labor productivity decrease. The productivity effect decreases low-
skilled labor and increases education.
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The intertemporal effect captures the effect of changes in subjective discount-
ing on production patterns. If the subjective discount factor increases, the value
of present day income increases such that more capital is invested to increase
low-skilled income. The same is true for labor such that the intertemporal effect
increases low-skilled labor and decreases education.
The credit constraint effect only occurs if credit constraints bind and intertem-
poral consumption allocation via credit markets is limited. The household uses
labor reallocation to smooth consumption over time. Two counteracting sub-
effects arise. Higher capital costs imply that a larger amount has to be repaid in
the second period such that the household increases education while decreasing
low-skilled work. However, higher capital costs imply a smaller loan amount,
such that less has to be repaid in the second period and education decrease
while low-skilled work increases.
We now consider the prevalence of the effects for the different combinations
of interest factor changes and credit regimes. In the TL-regime, the household
discounts with f = ι and faces capital costs τ. Using (4.8) to evaluate the impact
of an increasing unsecured interest factor ι on time allocation in the TL-regime
yields
sgn
(
dlTL
dι
)
= sgn(
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(hkhlk − hlhkk)(1+ ι)︸ ︷︷ ︸
intertemporal effect
).
Low-skilled work increases and education declines. This is a standard results.
A change in the unsecured interest factor ι does not affect capital costs τ (no
productivity effect), but it affects discounting. Consumption patterns are not
affected, because the household is not credit constrained (no credit constraint
effect), but production patterns are. Thus, the intertemporal effect determines
the overall change. The time allocations in all other credit market regimes are
unaffected by a change of ι since capital costs and subjective discounting are
independent of ι in all but the TL-regime.
Chapter 4. Credit Markets, Resources and Labor Allocation 74
If the secured interest factor τ in the TL-regime increases instead, the labor al-
location changes according to
sgn
(
dlTL
dτ
)
= sgn(
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
−hlk(1+ ι)︸ ︷︷ ︸
productivity effect
)
and low-skilled work decreases while education increases. Discounting is not
affected and neither an intertemporal nor a credit constraint effect occur. Since
the capital costs τ are affected, the productivity effect is present and determines
the overall change.
All three effects occur if the secured interest factor τ changes in the EL-regime.
The household is credit constrained and the secured interest factor depicts the
capital costs and is part of the subjective discount factor. Using (4.8) yields
sgn
(
dlEL
dτ
)
= sgn(
<0︷︸︸︷
fτ︸︷︷︸
c. constr. e.
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(hkhlk − hlhkk)(1+ f )︸ ︷︷ ︸
intertemp. e.
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
−hlk(1+ f )︸ ︷︷ ︸
prod. e.
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
− fkhl︸ ︷︷ ︸
c. constr. e.
),
(4.9)
which becomes
sgn
(
σ
(
f + c2c1
1+ f
)
− 1− ηc2
f h
)
(4.10)
after some calculus (see Appendix B.4 for details). Expression (4.10) is positive
for a small elasticities of intertemporal substitution η or a large elasticities of
substitution in low-skilled production σ. It is negative for a large η and a small
σ. A small elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in low- skilled
production implies a low substitutability between input factors. Thus, if capital
is reduced due to an increase in τ, it is costly to compensate capital with low-
skilled work. The productivity effect dominates and a higher interest factor
leads to less low-skilled work and more education.
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In the OL-regime, the secured interest factor τ represents the discount factor as
well as capital costs and
sgn
(
dlOL
dτ
)
= sgn(
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(hkhlk − hlhkk)(1+ τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
intertemporal effect
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
−hlk(1+ τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
productivity effect
) (4.11)
which becomes
sgn
(
dlOL
dτ
)
sgn
(
τ − 1− α
α
)
(4.12)
after rearrangement and substituting in the output elasticities of capital and
labor (A detailed derivation is given in Appendix B.4). Since the household is
not credit constrained, only the intertemporal and the productivity effect occur.
Both effects draw in different directions such that the change of low-skilled
work is ambiguous. Equation (4.12) implies that the effect of a higher interest
factor on low-skilled labor is negative for α < 1/(1 + τ), and positive for α >
1/(1 + τ). The increase of the secured interest factor leads to more education
and less low-skilled work if the productivity effect dominates the intertemporal
effect, i.e. if the output elasticity of labor in the low-skilled sector is sufficiently
small with α < 1/(1+ τ).
An increasing secured interest factor in the NO- and the SA-regimes has no ef-
fect on time allocation as it neither affects the subjective discount factor nor the
capital costs in these regimes. The same applies for changes of the saving inter-
est factor and time allocation in the TL-, EL-, OL- and NO-regimes. The effect
of an increasing interest factor for saving on time allocation in the SA-regime is
equivalent to the effect of an increasing interest factor for borrowing secured by
a collateral in the OL-regime. The household is not credit constrained and the
interest factor on saving φ represents the discount factor as well as the oppor-
tunity costs of capital.
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4.4 Common Pool Externalities
In this section we consider additionally a common pool resource with poorly
defined property rights. Low-skilled production depends on a regenerative re-
source, but high-skilled production is resource-independent. A fixed number of
potential resource users has unrestricted access to the resource and the number
of resource users is sufficiently large to avoid strategic behavior. Low-skilled
production of the representative household is given by h¯(l, k, x) = h(l, k)x with
‘effort’ h(l, k) and the resource stock x. The multiplicative combination of effort
and the resource stock is a common assumption in resource economics (Han-
nesson, 1983; Clark, 2005; Conrad, 2010) and simplifies the subsequent analysis.
Aggregate harvest reduces the stock size of the resource such that x is a function
of aggregate labor L and aggregate capital K with xK < 0 and xL < 0. Due to
the large number of resource users, each harvester neglects its individual effect
on the resource stock and the first order conditions become
hl(1+ f )x− w1−l = 0,
hk(1+ f )x− τ = 0 for the TL-,EL- and OL- regimes and
hk(1+ f )x− f = 0 for the NO- and SA-regimes.
(4.13)
Resource dynamics differ largely in their speed. Forest growth can be very
slow whereas the dynamics of rangelands or some fish species are relatively
fast compared to a human lifetime. Our work is motivated by the Indian inland
fishery of Chilika lagoon where catches increased several fold within two years
after an ecological regime shift. We therefore suppose a fast growing resource
for our model and assume that the resource reaches its steady state immediately
at the beginning of each period for a given level of aggregate harvesting effort.
The resource stock will be the same in both periods because l and k do not
differ between periods. To simplify the analysis further we assume identical
harvesters of mass one such that L = l and K = k. We define the stock elasticity
that measures the response of the steady state resource stock to harvesting effort
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as
ε = −xhh
x
. (4.14)
The stock elasticity is a measure for the common pool externality and increases
with the impact of the harvest on the steady state stock size. The stock elasticity
is high for resources with low reproduction rates and low density dependent
mortality rates such as whales and it is high for resources with low depletion
rates such as fertile soil or resources with high reproduction rates and high den-
sity dependent mortality rates such as some fish species. There is no common
pool externality for ε = 0 and the results are as in Table 4.1.
The direction of the overall effect of interest factor changes on time allocation
is still determined by (4.8) but with the first order conditions (4.13) instead of
(4.7). Although the individual harvester neglects his impact on the resource, his
marginal productivity of capital and labor in (4.13) is still affected by changes
in the resource abundance. He thus takes into account that the resource reacts
to effort changes resulting from interest factors changes. Table 4.2 summarizes
the change in low-skilled work in response to interest factor changes for the
different credit regimes. Appendix B.5 derives the results.
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+
1−
c 2 c 1
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)
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The results of Table 4.2 differ from the results of Table 4.1, because of the re-
source effect. The resource effect reflects the impact of changes in the resource
stock size on marginal labor productivity in low-skilled production and repre-
sents the negative externality of harvesting. If capital investment in the har-
vesting sector decreases as a response to rising capital costs, the resource stock
recovers and marginal labor productivity in low-skilled production increases.
The resource effect therefore draws in the opposite direction as the productiv-
ity effect and occurs only when the productivity effect also occurs. This implies
that the resource effect only occurs in the TL-, EL- and OL-regime as a response
to a change in the secured interest factor and in the SA-regime as a response to
a change in the savings interest factor. All other cases are unaffected by the in-
troduction of a common pool externality. If the secured interest factor changes
in the TL-regime, the direction of change in low-skilled work is determined by
sgn
(
dlTL
dτ
)
= sgn(
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
−hlkx(1+ ι)︸ ︷︷ ︸
productivity effect
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
−hlxk(1+ ι)︸ ︷︷ ︸
resource effect
) = sgn
(
ε− 1
σ
)
.
The sign of dlTL/dτ depends on the relative size of the two elasticities. A large
stock elasticity implies that the resource recovers strongly after a reduction in
total harvesting capital which increases the marginal productivity of labor and
increases the time allocated to low-skilled labor. A large substitution elasticity
in the low-skilled sector implies that capital can easily be substituted by labor
which also increases the time which is allocated to low-skilled production.
The direction of change in labor allocated to low-skilled production in the EL-
regime as a response to an increase of the secured interest factor is determined
by
sgn
(
dl
dτ
)
= sgn( fτ
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1+ f )(hkxhlkx− hlxhkkx)︸ ︷︷ ︸
intertemp. e.
− fkhlx
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
−(1+ f )hlkx︸ ︷︷ ︸
prod. e.
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
−(1+ f )hlxk︸ ︷︷ ︸
resource e.
).
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Rearrangement and substituting in the elasticities yield
sgn
(
σ
(
f + c2c2
1+ f
)
− 1− ηc2
f hx
+ εσ
(
ηc2
f hx
+
1− c2c1
1+ f
))
.
As without the resource externality, low-skilled labor decreases for a secured
interest factor increase if the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital
in the low-skilled sector is low. The resource externality has a positive impact
on the time allocated towards low-skilled work in most cases as the secured
interest factor increases. The effect of the resource externality on changes in
low-skilled labor is only negative if consumption increases strongly over time.
The direction of change in low-skilled work in the OL-regime is determined by
sgn
(
dl
dτ
)
= sgn(
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1+ τ)(hkxhlkx− hlxhkkx)︸ ︷︷ ︸
intertemp. e.
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
−(1+ τ)hlkx︸ ︷︷ ︸
prod. e.
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
−(1+ τ)xkhl︸ ︷︷ ︸
resource e.
)
which is equivalent to
sgn
(
dl
dτ
)
= sgn
(
1
σ
(
τ
(1− α)(1+ τ) − 1
)
+ ε
)
.
The expression is positive for a large substitution elasticity in low-skilled pro-
duction σ or a large stock elasticity ε.
It can only become negative for τ < (1− α)/α and a small σ or a small ε. As in
the case without resource externality, the condition for results in the SA-regime
are the same as in the OL-regime with φ instead of τ.
A strong resource externality leads to a strong recovery of the resource as capi-
tal is withdrawn from resource harvesting which has a positive effect on labor
productivity in the low-skilled sector. Thus, a large common pool externality
i.e. a large ε, leads to an increase of low-skilled labor with increasing interest
factors. In other words, credit market reforms that lower interest factors are
more likely to increase education in the presence of common pool externalities.
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4.5 Conclusion
This article examines the impact of interest rate changes on low-skilled labor
and education in developing economies with and without common pool re-
sources. Our model is motivated by the fragmented credit markets in fishing
villages around Chilika Lagoon, India, which are typical for informal credit
markets in developing economies. While it seems natural to respond to the ob-
served low education and high rural interest rates by improving credit markets
we have shown that lower interest rates can actually decrease education. The
mechanism leading to this result is the ‘productivity effect’: lower capital costs
increase investment in the low-skilled sector, which increases marginal produc-
tivity of low-skilled labor. Counteracting mechanisms are that lower subjective
discounting increases the present value of future benefits from education and
that resource externalities lower or reverse the productivity effect. Which of
these effects occur, depends on the household’s initial wealth, the affected in-
terest factor and the presence of common pool externalities. Which of the oc-
curring effects dominate, depends on the substitutability of labor and capital in
low-skilled production, the interest rate, the intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution in consumption and on the size of the common pool externality. Credit
market improvements are more likely to increase education if capital can easily
replace labor in low-skilled production, if the output share of capital is high, the
household has low preferences for consumption smoothing, the interest rates
are high and there are strong common pool externalities.
Interest factor reductions that decrease capital costs and increase investment in
low-skilled production improve the welfare of the current generation. The pol-
icy may however negatively affect future generations if parents do not consider
the full life of their offspring and higher capital investment increases child-labor
in low-skilled production. Credit market improvements are unequivocally ben-
eficial if their negative effect on subjective discounting outweighs the positive
effects on child-labor productivity such that education increases.
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Chapter 5
Separate or Mixed Production of
Timber, Livestock and Biodiversity
in the Caspian Forest
with Michael Manthey, Jack Ruitenbeek and Marvie
Mohadjer
The article is available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/
pii/S0921800910003216
Abstract: The temperate deciduous forest on the northern slopes of the Alborz
Mountains has a high biological diversity and many endemic species. Huge
areas are still old-growth forest but logging and grazing have degraded large
parts of the forest. These degraded areas have low timber and forage yields
and a species composition that differs from its natural state. In this study we
present an analytical and a numerical solution to the forest management prob-
lem by optimizing the benefits of livestock production, timber harvest and bio-
diversity conservation. We focus on the ecological interactions rather than on
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administrative restrictions. Our findings are based both, on theoretical con-
siderations and field investigations of ecological and economic parameters in
Azerbaijan and Iran. The results of the numerical optimization suggest that
it is optimal to separate timber and livestock production if biodiversity is not
valued. Livestock rearing is preferable at high discount rates whereas timber
production becomes more profitable at low discount rates. If the valuation of
diversity exceeds a certain threshold a combination of timber production and
livestock rearing is socially optimal since it yields a high biological diversity.
Erratum
The statement on page 73 of the published article: "The Hessian is either pos-
itive or negative semidefinite depending on the benefits of diversity, pd (Ap-
pendix A). However Arrow’s sufficiency criteria can still be met since the La-
grangian is concave in w for any h and s." is wrong. The sufficiency criteria
concern the maximized Lagrangian and nothing can be said about its curvature.
Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Steady-State in the Traditional Sector
As all n∗ individuals engaged in resource harvesting start off with the same
steady state bequest level br∗ , all of them invest
k∗ = min
{
(γX∗/2)2, br∗
}
, (A.1)
where X∗ is the steady-state resource stock. We consider the two cases (i) k∗ =
(γX∗/2)2 and (ii) k∗ = br∗ in turn.
In case (i), the steady-state resource stock is obtained from (2.5) as
X∗ =
ρ κ
ρ+ 12 n∗ γ2 κ
. (A.2)
Using this in (2.9) leads to
br∗ =
δ
1− δ (γX∗/2)
2. (A.3)
By assumption (2.2), br∗ < (γX∗/2)2, which contradicts the initial assumption
that capital investment is not constraint. Given assumption (2.2) case (i) does
not occur.
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In case (ii) the steady-state resource stock is obtained from (2.5) as
X∗ = κ
(
1− n∗ γ
√
br∗
ρ
)
. (A.4)
Using this in (2.9) leads to (2.12). Plugging (2.12) into (A.4) yields (2.13).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2.1
For clarity in the proofs we will use the following lemma:
Lemma A.1. The steady state bequest from resource harvesting, br∗, increases in δ, ρ
and κ. It increases in γ only if ρ > nδγ2κ and decreases in γ if the opposite holds.
The proof for this lemma follows from the partial derivatives of (2.12) with re-
spect to the respective parameters.
Proof of Proposition 2.1 Linearity and a slope smaller than unity of (2.8) to-
gether with (2.11) imply that bmt+1 > b
m
t ∀ bmt ∈ [β, bm∗ ). Define h as the share
of individuals for a given wealth level and a given resource stock that work
in the traditional sector. From utility maximization it follows that h(br∗, X∗) =
0 ∀ br∗ ∈ [β, bm∗ ) since br∗ < bm∗ implies yr∗ < ym∗ where yj∗ = bj∗/δ and j ∈ {m, r}.
limbt→0 db
r
t+1/db
r
t = ∞ and b
r
t+1 = 0 for b
r
t = 0 imply that b
r
t+1 > b
r
t ∀ brt ∈
(0, br∗). It follows that h(bm∗ , X∗) = 1 ∀ bm∗ ∈ [β, br∗). If br∗ = bm∗ then the steady
state incomes are equal in both sectors and the individuals are indifferent be-
tween both occupations.
We have shown in the proof for Lemma A.1 that brt+1 > b
r
t ∀ brt ∈ (0, br∗). It
follows that there is no bequest steady state below β if br∗ ≥ β.
Developed, modern economy: From Lemma A.1 we know that there are no
resource harvesters in steady state if β ≤ br∗ < bm∗ . It follows that if β ≤ br∗ < bm∗
then all individuals work in the modern sector in steady state and earn bm∗ /δ.
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Developed, mixed economy: The income from resource harvesting for a degen-
erated distribution of capital where n∗ ∈ [0, 1] individuals inherit bt is given
by
y˜t+1 = γ
√
ktκ
(
1− γn∗
ρ
√
kt
)
− kt + bt, (A.5)
where ∂y˜t+1/∂n∗ < 0. For the developed, mixed economy to occur, the income
in the modern sector, the resource productivity and the harvesting efficiency
must be such that γ
√
ktκ
(
1− γρ
√
kt
)
− kt + bm∗ < α − β + bm∗ < γ
√
bm∗ κ. It
follows that there must be a n∗ such that γ
√
bm∗ κ
(
1− γn∗ρ
√
bm∗
)
= α− β+ bm∗ .
The bequest is only in steady state if the income from resource harvesting equals
the incomes in the modern sector. The share of individuals that equalize the
income across both sectors is given by (2.14).
Developed, traditional economy: Follows directly from Lemma A.1.
A.3 Stability and Monotonicity
The steady state bequest in the modern sector is locally stable. This follows
from the slope of (2.8) with respect to bt which is given by δ for all levels of
bequest. The steady state in the industrial sector is therefore attractive for all
bequests in the interval [β,∞) if br∗ < β. The conditions for local stability of the
bequest in the resource sector are characterized in the following. The bequest of
all dynasties of resource harvesters approach (2.12) if the bequest of all resource
harvesters is equal, sufficiently close to (2.12) and
4n∗γ2δκ < 3ρ. (A.6)
The motions of the bequest towards the steady state bequest (2.12) are mono-
tone if the bequest of all resource harvesters is equal, sufficiently close to (2.12)
and
4n∗γ2δκ < ρ. (A.7)
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The resource stock for a degenerated distribution of harvesting capital is given
by
X˜t+1 = κ
(
1− γn∗
ρ
√
bt
)
. (A.8)
Setting Xt+1 = X˜t+1 in (2.9) and differentiate it with respect to bt, then setting
bt = br∗ yields
∂brt+1
∂brt
=
1
2
− 2n∗γ
2δκ
ρ
which is always equal or smaller than 1/2, larger than minus one if 4n∗γ2δκ <
3ρ and positive if 4n∗γ2δκ < ρ.
Differentiating (2.9) with respect to bt and setting then Xt+1 = X˜t+1 and bt = br∗
yields
∂brt+1
∂brt
=
ρ+ n∗δ4γ2κ
2ρ
(
1− n∗4γ
2δκ
ρ+ n∗δ4γ2κ
)
=
1
2
.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2.3
Monotonicity implies stability. Note hat np ≤ n implies br∗ ≥ β for n∗ = np. It
follows that the economy becomes developed if n∗ ≤ n since the only steady
state is in the interval [β,∞) and its basin of attraction is [0,∞). Now we need to
establish that n∗ ≤ np for bp = br∗. From Lemma A.1 follows that the rich never
engage in resource harvesting if br∗ < β. It follows that there can be no br∗ < β if
np ≤ n. The same argument applies to the second case of Proposition 2.3.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 2.4
A redistribution that increases the initial wealth of the advantaged above β
shift them to the basin of attraction of bm∗ . A reduction of individuals in the
poor bequest steady state increases the steady state wealth of the poor since
∂br∗/∂n∗ < 0 . A redistribution that satisfies (2.20) increases the share of the
Appendix A 89
rich and in the long run the wealth of the poor and thus increases long-term
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.
The worst-off are the disadvantaged in the first generation when (A.7) holds.
Condition (2.20) states that the share of the individuals in the poor steady state
reduces by µ such that ν = n∗ − µ < n∗ and the resource stock increases. If the
increasing resource stock overcompensate the disadvantaged we have
γ
√
br∗ − τκ
(
1− γνρ
√
br∗ − τ
)
≥ γ√br∗κ (1− γn∗ρ √br∗) which reduces to (2.21).
Note further that if k(br∗, X∗) ≤ br∗ binds then k(br∗ − τ, X∗ + e) ≤ br∗ − τ must
bind for any e ≥ 0 as well.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 2.5
There are only poor individuals in steady state if the economy is underdevel-
oped and br∗ < bm∗ for n∗ → 1. If (2.22) holds then min{bm∗ − τ, br∗ + ντ/(1−
ν)} ≥ β and all individuals are rich. The rest follows from [εbr∗ + (1− ε)bm∗ <
bm∗ ]/δ ∀ br∗ ∈ [0, β) with ε ∈ (0, 1).
A.7 First Best
The first best allocation is found by maximizing income with respect to n, k, and
X:
max
n,k,X
{
n
(
γ
√
k X− k
)
+ (1− n) (α− β)
}
s.t. n γ
√
k X = ρX (1− X/κ)
⇔ max
n,k
{
n
(
γ κ
√
k−
(
n
γ2 κ
ρ
+ 1
)
k
)
+ (1− n) (α− β)
}
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The first-order conditions are
1
2
γ κ
1√
k
− n γ
2 κ
ρ
− 1 = 0
γ κ
√
k− 2 n γ
2 κ
ρ
k− k− (α− β) = 0
Rearranging leads to (2.16) and (2.17). Inserting (2.16) and (2.17) into γ
√
k X− k
with the given constraint leads to (2.18).
A.8 Resource Regulation
Maximizing steady-state bequest of resource harvesters with respect to k¯ is
equivalent to
max
k¯
{
γ
√
k¯ κ
(
1− n∗ γ
ρ
√
k¯
)
− k¯
}
The first-order condition of this optimization problem yields
k¯ =
(
γ ρ κ
2 (n∗ γ2 κ + ρ)
)2
X¯∗ = κ
2
(
1+
ρ
n∗ γ2 κ + ρ
)
b¯∗r =
δ
1− δ
γ2 ρ κ2
4 (n∗ γ2 κ + ρ)
At a resource stock of size X¯, the indiviudal marginal productivity of harvesting
capital is
p =
d
dk¯
[
γ
√
k¯ X¯∗
]
=
γ
2
√
k¯
X¯∗ = n∗ γ
2 κ + 2 ρ
2 ρ
Appendix A 91
A.9 Proof of Proposition 2.6
We have k¯ < br∗ if and only if
γ ρ κ
2 n∗ γ2 κ + 2 ρ
<
γ ρ κ
n∗ γ2 κ + ρ/δ
,
which holds if and only if (2.24) holds. Under this condition, we also have
b¯r > br∗, as
d
dk¯
[
γ
√
k¯ κ
(
1− n∗ γ
ρ
√
k¯
)
− k¯
]∣∣∣∣
k¯=br∗
=
1
2
γ
1√
br∗
κ − n∗ γ
2 κ
ρ
− 1
=
−n∗ γ2 κ + ρ/δ− 2 ρ
2 ρ
< 0.
Using that br∗ < β, with br∗ given by (2.12), condition (2.25) implies
δ
1− δ
γ2 ρ κ2
4 (n∗ γ2 κ + ρ)
>
(
δργκ
δn∗γ2κ + ρ
)2
⇔
(
δn∗γ2κ + ρ
)2
> δ ρ (1− δ) 4
(
n∗ γ2 κ + ρ
)
⇒ δ
(
n∗γ2κ + 2 ρ
)2
> 2 ρ
(
n∗γ2κ + 2 ρ
)
⇒ δ > 2 ρ
n∗γ2κ + 2 ρ
>
ρ
n∗γ2κ + 2 ρ
. (A.9)
A.10 Proof of Proposition 2.7
The amount parents bequest is higher than what they inherited, because their
income increased. It thus suffices to show that the market value of the capital
allowance per capita increases in the number e of fishermen that leave the sec-
tor. We show this for the regulation scenario where the total capital allowance is
optimally adjusted according to the number of fishermen in the resource sector
in a given period. The capita market value of a harvesting allowance increases
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with e:
d
de
[
(n∗ − e)γ2κ + 2ρ
2ρ
(
γρκ
2((n∗ − e)γ2κ + ρ)
)2]
= −eγ2κ + (n∗ − e)γ
2κ + 2ρ
(n∗ − e)γ2κ + ρ 2eγ
2κ > 0.
A.11 Capital costs of fishing in Chilika lagoon
As fishing capital, an average fishing unit owns 63 kg (sd = 73) of nets, at a
price of 680 Rs per kg (sd = 960), 95% of the fishing units use a boat worth
38,000 Rs (sd = 28,640), and 53% use an engine, which costs 18,000 Rs (sd =
8,230). The cost to setup a fishing unit is therefore 63× 680 + 0.95× 38, 000 +
0.53 × 18, 000 = 88, 480 Rs. Using the average live spans of 5.9 years (sd =
6.3) for nets, 10.6 years (sd = 5.6) for boats, and 8.2 years (sd = 3.9) for en-
gines, and yearly repair costs of 130 Rs (sd = 260) per kg of net, 3,970 Rs (sd
= 5,020) for a boat, and 5,480 Rs (sd = 3,640) for an engine, and fuel costs of
3.7 l (sd = 3.0) per day at 45 Rs per liter for a motorized fishing unit, we obtain
capital costs of
(
63× (680/5.9 + 130) + 0.95× (38, 000/10.6+ 3, 970) + 0.53×
(18, 000/8.2+ 5, 480)
)
/225+ 0.53× 3.7× 45 = 207 Rs per fishing day.
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Appendix to Chapter 4
B.1 Derivation of the Five Credit Regimes
From the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (4.5) and definition (4.6) follows
(A) v = 0 or f = τ +
λ3
λ2
(B) z = 0 or f = ι
(C) s = 0 or f = φ
(D) λ3 = 0 or v = k. (B.1)
Table B.1 list the 16 possible combinations between A,B,C and D and shows that only
five combinations (TL, EL, OL, NO and SA) do not lead to contradictions.
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1. R1: f = ι and f = φ (B=1 and C=1) is not possible since ι 6= φ.
2. R2: f = τ + λ3 and f = φ (A=1 and C=1) is not possible since τ > φ and λ3 ≥ 0.
3. R3: λ3 = 0 and f = ι (B=1 and D=0) is not possible since λ3 > 0 is needed to
fulfill ι = f ≤ τ + λ3 and ι > τ.
4. R4: v = 0 and v = k is not optimal because it implies k = 0 which is ruled out by
the Inada conditions.
B.2 Relation between Household’s Discount Factor,
Credit Market Regimes and Initial Wealth Level
We show that f (κ) is a non-increasing continuous function in R+0. Define Z(κ) =
supc1,c2,q{u(c1, c2)|c1− g1(q) ≤ κ, c2− g2(q) ≤ 0, q ≥ 0}with the vector q of an arbitrary
dimension. Furthermore, g1 = h + v + z− k− s and g2 = h + w + φs− τv− ιz, both
concave, such that Z is also concave. Take f (κ) := u1u2 , evaluated at (c
∗
1 , c
∗
2) for which
the supremum is attained.
Consider Z˜(κ) = u(c1, c∗2) with c1 = κ + g1(q∗). Then, Z(κ) ≥ Z˜(κ) with equality for
κ = κ∗, and Z˜′(κ∗) = u1(c∗1 , c
∗
2). Hence, Z
′
+(κ
∗) ≥ u1(c∗1 , c∗2) ≥ Z′−(κ∗). Furthermore, as
Z is concave, Z′−(κ∗) ≥ Z′+(κ∗). Therefore,
Z′+(κ∗) = Z′−(κ∗) = u1(c∗1 , c
∗
2).
u1
u2
is increasing in u1 due to linear homogeneity of u such that it is non-increasing in κ.
The rest follows from the credit regimes definition.
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B.3 Derivation of Equation (4.8)
To determine the sign of dl/di with i ∈ {ι, τ, φ} we use the implicit function theorem
and Cramer’s Rule, i.e. dl/di = |H j,i|/|H j| for j ∈ {TL, EL, OL, NO, SA} and the Jaco-
bian matrix given by
H j =
y∗ll y∗lk
y∗kl y
∗
kk

and
H j,i =
−y∗li y∗lk
−y∗ki y∗kk

with i ∈ {ι, τ, φ}, j ∈ {TL, EL, OL, NO, SA} and the Lagrangian at the optimum y∗ (see
equation (4.4)). A locally unambiguously defined optimum implies |H j| > 01 such that
the denominator only influences the size of the effect but not the direction and equation
(4.8) determines the sign.
B.4 Proofs for Table 4.1
We use (4.8) and (4.7) to determine the direction of change of labor reallocation to low-
skilled work as a response of rising interest factors.
Proof of dl j/dι:
TL: For j = TL and f = ι:
sgn
(
dlTL
dι
)
= sgn((hkhlk − hlhkk)(1+ ι)). (B.2)
1The objective function is concave if and only if the Hessian Matrix is semi definite (|H j| ≥
0). We assume a locally unambiguously defined optimum. Then, |H j| = 0 occurs with proba-
bility zero.
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For a linear homogenous production function the ratio of the marginal productivities
is only a function of the factor input ratio such that
d(hk/hl)
d(k/l)
k/l
hk/hl
=
d(hk/hl)
dk
l
k/l
hk/hl
.
The inverse elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in low-skilled produc-
tion, σ, can therefore be represented by
1
σ
= −d ln(hk/hl)
d ln(k/l)
= −d ln(hk/hl)
d ln(k)
= −d ln(hk)
d ln(k)
+
d ln(hl)
d ln(k)
= k
(
hlk
hl
− hkk
hk
)
= l
(
hlk
hk
− hll
hl
)
.
Using the Euler equation hkk + hl l = h and its first derivative with respect to k yields
1
σ
=
hlkh
hlhk
(B.3)
Multiplying both sides of (B.2) with k/[(1+ ι)hkhl ] and using (B.3) gives
sgn
(
dlTL
dι
)
= sgn
(
1
σ
)
.
EL,OL,NO,SA: For j ∈ {EL, OL, NO, SA} and f = ι, y∗lι = y∗kι = 0 such that dl j/dι = 0.
Proof of dl j/dτ:
TL: For j = TL and f = ι:
sgn
(
dlTL
dτ
)
= sgn(−hlk(1+ ι)).
EL: For j = EL and f = τ + λ3/λ2:
sgn
(
dlEL
dτ
)
= sgn ( fτ(hkhlk − hlhkk)(1+ f )− hlk(1+ f )− fkhl) . (B.4)
Appendix B 98
The inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption can be expressed
by
1
η
=
d ln(u1/u2)
d ln(c2/c1)
=
fc2 c2
f
=
fc1 c1
f
= −u22c2
u2
= −u11c1
u1
. (B.5)
The derivation of this expression is analogous to (B.3).
Calculate
fk =
u2u11hk − u1u22(hk − τ)
u22
=
u11hk
u2
u1c1
u1c1
− u1u22(hk − τ)c2
u2u2c2
.
Inserting the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and f = u1u2 gives
fk = − f hkηc1
c2
c2
+ f
hk − τ
ηc2
.
Replacing hk − τ by − f hk from (4.7) yields
fk = − f hkηc1
c2
c2
− f f hk
ηc2
.
Inserting fc2 = f /(ηc2) from (B.5) yields
fk = − fc2hk( c2c1 + f ).
The derivative of the subjective discount factor with respect to the interest factor τ can
be expressed as
fτ =
u1u22k
u22
= − fc2k.
Multiply (B.4) by 1/(hlhk), use the elasticity of substitution (B.3) and insert fk = − fc2hk(c2/c1+
f ) and fτ = − fc2k to attain
sgn
(
dl
dτ
)
= sgn
(
fτ(
hlk
hl
− hkk
hk
)(1+ f )− hlk
hlhk
(1+ f )− fk
hk
)
)
= sgn
(
− fc2k(hlkhl −
hkk
hk
)(1+ f )− hlk
hlhk
(1+ f ) + fc2(
c2
c1
+ f )
)
= sgn
(
− fc2
σ
(1+ f )− 1+ f
hσ
+ fc2( f +
c2
c1
)
)
.
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Multiply with σ/( fc2(1+ f )) and re-arrange to attain
sgn
(
dl
dτ
)
= sgn
(
−(1+ 1
h fc2
) + σ
f + c2c1
1+ f
)
= sgn
(
σ
f + c2c1
1+ f
− 1− ηc2
h f
)
)
.
OL: For j = OL and f = τ:
sgn
(
dlOL
dτ
)
= sgn((hkhlk − hlhkk)(1+ τ)− hlk(1+ τ)). (B.6)
Multiplying (B.6) with ((1+ τ)hlkhk)
−1 leads to
sgn
(
dl
dτ
)
= sgn
(
1− hlhkk
hlkhk
− 1
hk
)
.
Note that the first order condition for capital in (4.7) leads to
1
hk
=
1
τ
+ 1. (B.7)
Now insert the first derivation of the Euler equation of the production function (see
(B.3)) and (B.7) to attain
sgn
(
dl
dτ
)
= sgn
(
hl l
khk
− 1
τ
)
= sgn
(
τ − khk
lhl
)
= sgn
(
τ − 1− α
α
)
.
NO,SA: For j ∈ {NO, SA} and f = τ, y∗lτ = y∗kτ = 0 such that dl j/dτ = 0.
Proof of dl j/dφ:
TL,EL,OL,NO: For j ∈ {TL, EL, OL, NO} and f = φ,y∗lφ = y∗kφ = 0 such that dl j/dφ =
0.
SA: The derivation of dlSA/dφ is equivalent to dlOL/dτ, i.e.
sgn
(
dl
dφ
)
= sgn
(
φ
1− α
α
)
.
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B.5 Proofs for Table 4.2
We use (4.8) and (4.13) to determine the direction of change of labor reallocation to
low-skilled work as a response of rising interest factors.
Proof of dl j/dι:
TL: For j =TL and f = ι:
sgn
(
dlTL
dι
)
= sgn (hkx(hlkx + hlxk)(1+ ι)− hlx(hkkx + hkxk)(1+ ι))
= sgn ((hkxhlkx− hlxhkkx)(1+ ι) + (hkxhlxk − hlxhkxk)(1+ ι))
= sgn ((hkxhlkx− hlxhkkx)(1+ ι)) ,
which is equivalent to
sgn
(
dlTL
dι
)
= sgn
(
1
σ
)
.
EL, OL, NO, SA: For j ∈ {EL, OL, NO, SA} and f = ι,y∗lι = y∗kι = 0 such that dl j/dι = 0.
Proof of dl j/dτ:
TL: For j=TL and f = τ:
sgn
(
dlTL
dτ
)
= sgn(−hlkx(1+ ι)− hlxk(1+ ι)).
Multiplication with k/[(1+ ι)hlx] gives
sgn
(
dlTL
dτ
)
= sgn
(
−hlk khl − xk
k
x
)
.
Expansion by hhk/(hhk) yields
sgn
(
dlTL
dτ
)
= sgn
(
−hlk khl
hhk
hhk
− xk kx
hhk
hhk
)
.
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Replacing xk by xhhk, multiplying by h/(hkk) and usig the elasticity (B.3) and (4.14)
gives
sgn
(
dlTL
dτ
)
= sgn
(
hk
k
h
(
− hhlk
hlhk
− xh hx
))
= sgn
(
− 1
σ
+ ε
)
EL: For j=EL and f = τ + λ3/λ2:
sgn
(
dlEL
dτ
)
= sgn (− fτhlx[(1+ f )(hkkx + hkxk) + fkhkx] + (hkx fτ − 1)[(1+ f )(hlkx + hlxk) + fkhlx])
= sgn(− fτhlx(1+ f )hkkx− fτhlx(1+ f )hkxk − fτhlx fkhkx + hkx fτ(1+ f )hlkx
+ hkx fτ(1+ f )hlxk + hkx fτ fkhlx− (1+ f )hlkx− (1+ f )hlxk − fkhlx)
= sgn (− fτhlx(1+ f )hkkx + hkx fτ(1+ f )hlkx− (1+ f )hlkx− (1+ f )hlxk − fkhlx)
= sgn
(− fτx2(1+ f )(hkkhl − hkhlk)− (1+ f )hlkx− (1+ f )hlxk − fkhlx) .
(B.8)
Calculate
fτ =
ku22u1
u22
= − k f
ηc2
(B.9)
and
fk =
u2u11(hkx + hxk)− u1u22(hkx + hxk − τ)
u22
=
u11(hkx + hxk)u1c1
u2u1c1
− f u22(hkx + hxk − τ)c2
u2c2
= − f
η
(hkx + hxhhk)
c1
+
f
η
(hkx + hxhhk − τ)
c2
=
f hk
η
(x + hxh)
(
− 1
c1
+
1
c2
)
− f τ
ηc2
. (B.10)
Multiply (B.8) with (hlhkx2(1 + f ))−1, rearrange (B.3) to get hkkhl − hkhlk = −hhlk/k
and (4.13) to obtain hkx(1 + f ) = τ and insert both expressions together with (B.10)
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and (B.9) in (B.8), replace xk by xhhk and rearrange (B.8) to obtain
sgn
(
dlEL
dτ
)
= sgn
(
fτhhlk
hlhkk
− hlk
hlhkx
− xk
hkx2
− fk
(1+ f )hkx
)
= sgn
(
− f hhlk
ηc2hlhk
− hlk
hlhkx
− xk
hkx2
− f hk
η(1+ f )hkx
(x + hxh)
(
− 1
c1
+
1
c2
)
+
f τ
ηc2(1+ f )hkx
)
= sgn
(
− f
ηc2σ
− 1
σhx
+
ε
xh
− f (x + hxh)
η(1+ f )x
(
− 1
c1
+
1
c2
)
+
f τ
ηc2(1+ f )hkx
)
= sgn
(
− f
ηc2σ
− σ
−1 − ε
hx
− f (1− ε)
η(1+ f )
(
c1 − c2
c1c2
)
+
f
ηc2
)
= sgn
(
f
ηc2
(
− 1
σ
− 1− ε
1+ f
(
c1 − c2
c1
)
+ 1
)
− σ
−1 − ε
hx
)
. (B.11)
Multiply with σηc2/ f and ’isolate‘ ε to attain
sgn
(
σ
(
f + c2c2
1+ f
)
− ηc2
f hx
− 1+ εσ
(
ηc2
f hx
+
1− c2c1
1+ f
))
.
OL: For j = EL and f = τ
sgn
(
dlOL
dτ
)
= sgn (−hlx(hkkx + hkxk)(1+ τ) + (hkx− 1)(hlkx + hlxk)(1+ τ))
= sgn ((−hlxhkkx− hlxhkxk + hkxhlkx + hkxhlxk − hlkx− hlxk)(1+ τ))
= sgn ((−hlxhkkx + hkxhlkx− hlkx− hlxk)(1+ τ))
= sgn
(−[x2(hlhkk − hkhlk) + hlkx + hlxk](1+ τ)) .
Use then the relationship hkkhl − hkhlk = −hhlk/k from (B.3) and the elasticity of sub-
stitution, insert xk = xhhk and divide by hlx, hkx and (1+ τ) to obtain
sgn
(
dlOL
dτ
)
= sgn
(
hhlk
hkhlk
− hlk
hlhkx
− xk
hkx2
)
= sgn
(
σ−1
(
1
k
− 1
hx
)
− xk
hkx2
)
= sgn
([
σ−1
(
hx
k
− 1
)
− xhhkhx
hkx2
])
= sgn
([
σ−1
(
hx
k
− 1
)
+ ε
])
.
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Using the output elasticity of capital 1− α and the relation hkx = τ/(1+ τ) from (4.13)
yields
sgn
(
dlOL
dτ
)
= sgn
(
1
σ
(
τ
(1− α)(1+ τ) − 1
)
+ ε
)
.
Multiply with σ to attain
sgn
(
dlOL
dτ
)
= sgn
(
τ
(1− α)(1+ τ) − 1+ εσ
)
.
NO,SA: For j ∈ {NO, SA} and f = τ, y∗lτ = y∗kτ = 0 such that dl j/dτ = 0.
Proof of dl j/dφ:
TL, EL, OL, NO: For j ∈ {TL, EL, OL, NO} and f = φ, y∗lφ = y∗kφ = 0 such that
dl j/dφ = 0.
SA: The derivation of dlSA/dφ is equivalent to dlOL/dτ, i.e.
sgn(dlSA/dφ) = sgn(φ/[σ(1− α)(1+ φ)]− ε).
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